Elite Interests or Immigrant Interests?
A Case Study of the Peruvian American Lobby and its Political Agenda

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Abstract

This thesis looks at the ways in which the elite demographic of the leaders of the Peruvian American lobby impacts the lobby’s discourse and activities on behalf of Peruvian Americans. To evaluate the impact, I apply content analysis and close reading to the activities and endorsements of the Peruvian American National Roundtable (PANR), the Peruvian American Political Action Committee of New Jersey (PAPAC), and the Peruvian American Political Organizations USA (PAPO). I also look at the backgrounds of the leaders and the ways they describe their organizations’ missions and activities.

I find that the leaders, well-connected businessmen, indeed either use their organizations to advance their business interests or perceive Peruvian interests through the lens of free-market liberalism by supporting trade promotion agreements, organizing self-promotional events, condemning the Peruvian left, and conducting workshops for businesses. Notably, I find that while PANR’s class interests and free-market liberalism permeate all their activities and endorsements, allegedly on behalf of all Peruvian Americans, PAPAC and PAPO also engage in politically risky activities on behalf of undocumented immigrants and endorse only immigrant-and social-service-friendly Democrats for office. This demonstrates that for the leaders of PAPAC and PAPO, their role as self-interested business elites coexists with their political entrepreneurship for Peruvian immigrants.

These findings suggest that politicians should be aware that immigrant interest groups’ discourse on immigrant interests may not reflect the interests of the immigrant population and that politicians look also to less mainstream groups and individuals in order to understand the interests of their constituents. The findings suggest that leaders of immigrant interest groups recognize their own interests and ideology and work to ensure that their agendas reflect the interests and ideology of the immigrant population. And, finally, the findings of this thesis are important to scholars of both interest groups and immigrant organizing, namely political transnationalism, as they have failed to investigate the impact that the particular demographic of leaders of immigrant interest groups may have on the construction of discourse and activities on behalf of immigrants.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

In the U.S. political system, those with money have the loudest voice and often use their voice to maintain the unequal status quo. Despite the incredible progress that some organizations of historically marginalized populations have made, the U.S. continues to drift further from equality, particularly in terms of economic wellbeing.

Literature on interest groups shows that one reason for this uneven progress is that the rise of interest groups in marginal populations has not succeeded in bringing voice to those entire populations. These scholars show that the leaders of interest groups still tend to be of the elite – wealthier and better connected - within the marginal community, and therefore possess some interests and ideologies that are more similar to those of the mainstream elite than the marginal community (Strolovitch 2007; Baumgartner and Leech 1998).

When we consider marginalized populations and interest groups, we do not always think of immigrants. But with the population rapidly growing and struggling for pathways to citizenship and continuing to face xenophobia and other impediments to inclusion, the numerous immigrant interest groups are essential to analyze.

However, literature on political transnationalism, the approach that has come to dominate the study of immigrant political organizing, has yet to investigate the possible impact of the groups’ elite leaders’ particular demographic on the construction of discourses and activities pertaining to immigrant populations. Scholars of political transnationalism

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1 *Political transnationalism* here is defined as the direct and indirect cross-border participation of migrants in the politics of the country of origin (Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Ostergaard-Nielson 2001).
argue that immigrant interest groups work for the interests of the immigrant community and country of origin and that, through such work, the groups contribute to the incorporation of the immigrant community in U.S. politics. But in reality, while this process is happening, the interests and ideology of the elites who lead these organizations are, likely unwittingly, shaping the discourse and activities surrounding immigrants into the mold of the status quo. As Strolovitch showed of African American and women’s rights groups, immigrant interest groups are simultaneously vehicles of change and supporters of the status quo, as they knock down some barriers while buttressing others.

This thesis takes the case of the mainstream Peruvian American lobby to fill the hole in the political transnationalism literature and demonstrate how, similar to the cases of other marginal groups, the members of the immigrant population who end up rising to become leaders of the interest groups are of the business elite, and therefore possess interests and free-market liberal ideology that shape the way they interpret immigrant interests and sometimes may even lead them to use their groups to serve their own self-interest (though self-interested action is not always possible to distinguish from ideological action when the ideology serves the self-interest). Unfortunately, these business interests and free-market liberalism are already dominant in the mainstream political system.

This thesis examines the mainstream Peruvian American interest groups, namely the Peruvian American National Roundtable (PANR) and the Peruvian American Political Organizations USA (PAPO) and one of PAPO’s member organizations, the Peruvian American Political Action Committee of New Jersey (PAPAC). These three are the only
organizations that regularly meet with and endorse politicians to advocate on behalf of Peruvians living in the U.S. and that also receive considerable press.\(^2\)

I ultimately find that the leaders of the three organizations that make up the lobby are self-interested and ideological, but that the leaders of two of them also act as political representatives of and advocates for the Peruvian population in the U.S. Some of the resulting discourse and activities are therefore focused on supporting businesses, expanding trade, enhancing the public image of the lobby, endorsing conservative politicians, and excluding the Latin American “Left,” while other discourse and activities focus on immigration reform. By taking the political risk of advocating for undocumented immigrants, the leaders of some of the organizations indeed assume the role of political entrepreneurs for the immigrant community, while simultaneously acting in their own self-interest and according to their belief in free-market liberalism in other areas of their roles as leaders.

It is possible to theorize about some of interests of Peruvians living in the U.S. based on a few statistical facts. There has been no extensive poll of their political interests, but the Peruvian Embassy’s 2010 survey of Peruvians living in the U.S. who are registered to vote in Peru included one question about their greatest worries. The top responses were employment, immigration status, and language acquisition. According to the Census Bureau’s 2008 American Community Survey (ACS), there are about 550,000 people of Peruvian origin living in the U.S, 60% of whom are U.S. citizens. The Peruvian Embassy, however, speculates that the number of Peruvians in the U.S. is actually over one million, higher than

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\(^2\) Other Peruvian American political organizations include the Peruvian American Chambers of Commerce, which are active in several states to represent local and national Peruvian American business interests. There also exists an outlier group of political organizations, including Instituto de Estudios y Capacitación Integral (INDECAPI) and Ciudadanos de la Segunda Categoría en el Exterior which consists of intellectual debate groups that sometimes publish and rally behind Peruvian immigrant causes. I focus my research on PANR, PAPO and PAPAC, as they are the most active and visible advocates of Peruvian Americans, but I will also provide information for the other organizations in Appendix D, as they complicate the image of mainstream Peruvian American advocacy.
the ACS count because many undocumented immigrants were not reported. The ACS finds that the average Peruvian in the U.S. is slightly economically and educationally advantaged compared other Latino and even national averages. However, as approximately half of the Peruvians in the U.S. are in fact undocumented, it is likely that the population’s average levels of incorporation, education, and income are much lower. These statistics imply that Peruvian American interests may involve obtaining citizenship or documentation to remain in the U.S., education, and, perhaps, growth within the information, finance, and service industries (areas in which most Peruvian Americans work, according to the ACS).

The leaders of the mainstream Peruvian American organizations, on the other hand, are all documented immigrants, if not citizens of the U.S. Most of them own or help run large businesses, some of which are multinational. They speak English fluently and most hold advanced degrees, particularly MBA’s. Some leaders also co-chair their state Hispanic or Peruvian Chambers of Commerce. Thus, the leaders of the organizations appear to come from a different class and level of incorporation than the average Peruvian immigrant. Therefore it is possible that their interests also differ from those of the average Peruvian immigrant (and even more so the average Peruvian in Peru).

My research question is thus: how does the particular demographic of the leaders of the mainstream Peruvian American political organizations impact the crafting of their agendas? Because the interests of the leaders of the lobby do not appear to be the same as the interests of most Peruvians living in the U.S. or Peru, my hypothesis is that, in addition to advocating for the interests of Peruvian immigrants, the leaders of the lobby are concerned

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5 Based on the “Leadership” link at www.panr.us and on LexisNexis and Google searches of the names of PAPAC’s leaders.
with using their groups’ agendas to advance the economic success of their companies and their own political careers. I further hypothesize that when the leaders attempt to work for the benefit of the Peruvian immigrant population, their perception of the population’s interests is filtered through a free-market liberal ideology.

**Research Question**

Recent scholarship on immigration has made much of political transnationalism as a new way to look at immigrant organizing in the host country for the benefit of the home country and the immigrant population. These scholars have evaluated the individual traits and external conditions that lead to such activity, the tactics that immigrants employ, and the impact that such activity has on home and host countries, as well as the immigrants themselves. But despite the fact that some of these studies have found that most political transnational actors are more educated, wealthier, better connected, and less marginalized than the rest of their immigrant communities, there has been no research investigating the possible impact that such a demographic may have on the construction of discourses of immigrant interests.

Most (though not all) scholars of political transnationalism do not pay attention to the possible particular interests and ideology of politically transnational organizations that claim to serve the interests of immigrants and home country (Kurien 2007; Jones-Correa 1998; Portes et al 2008; Smith 2007; Vertovec 2004, Escobar 2004; Itzigsohn 2008). But why should it be assumed that these organizations convey the interests of their communities and countries of origin if those immigrants who rise to be supposed leaders of their communities and intermediaries between the two countries are of a different class of immigrants? These
scholars overlook the possibility of personal interests and ideology of immigrant interest group leaders leading to transnational and domestic policy agendas that may differ from the interests and ideology of the communities they claim to represent. The lack of critical analysis of these interest group agendas may result not only in flawed theory, but also in the perpetuation of marginalization of some immigrant interests and the dominance of the elite interests because politicians, hoping to earn votes from their immigrant constituencies, look to such organizations for views on foreign and domestic policy.

This thesis project looks at the political activity of Peruvian American political elites and asks what interests the mainstream Peruvian lobby considers in crafting its organizational transnational and immigrant policy agenda. I ask whether the leaders of the organizations have personal interests at stake in the agendas and also how the leaders’ interpretation of the needs of their constituents is filtered by free-market liberalism. And I ask how these new factors impact the lobby’s construction of discourses and agendas surrounding immigrant interests.

In my thesis, I refer to U.S. bilateral trade agreements, such as the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (USPTPA), as “bilateral trade agreements,” though my subjects are cited referring to them as “free trade agreements” or “FTA’s” (or “TLC’s” in Spanish). I sometimes refer to the USPTPA as “the Agreement.” I use the terms “lobby”, “interest group”, and “political organization” interchangeably to refer to groups that use advocacy to influence politicians or public officials, though I also use “political organization” when I want to broaden my subject to include organizations that advocate for their political beliefs but do not officially meet with or endorse politicians. “Lobby” can be used to describe a single organization or the collection of interest groups. I only use the term “political action
committee” when referring to interest groups that raise money for electoral campaign contributions and employ lobbyists to influence politicians or public officials.

Adopting Ostergaard-Nielson’s use of the term, I use “political transnationalism” to refer to different types of “cross-border participation in the politics of their country of origin” by immigrants and also “their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country (or international organizations).” I also adopt Ostergaard-Nielson’s distinction between “homeland politics,” which means political activity of immigrants directed toward the country of origin, and “immigrant politics,” which means “the political activities that migrants…undertake to better their situation in the receiving country” (Ostergaard-Nielson 2001). From an array of definitions presented by Eagleton, I have chosen to define “ideology” as “a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class” (Eagleton 1991). And after a preliminary look at the backgrounds of the leaders of the Peruvian organizations, I identified free-market liberalism, drawing from Adams (2001), as their probable ideology.

To answer my questions, I analyzed the websites, publications, and news articles by and about the various organizations in order to determine what their motivations are, whom they claim to represent, how they incorporate their constituency into their agenda-setting, and how they frame their agendas. I also interviewed the leaders of PAPAC, PAP, PANR, INDECAPI, and two Chambers of Commerce to further understand their positions and how they frame them. And I researched the positions of the candidates endorsed by the mainstream Peruvian lobby.

_Literature Review_
The literature on agendas and discourse of immigrant interest groups can be divided into four strands. Some scholars argue that the interest groups are first accountable to their country of origin, and thus are sometimes at odds with U.S. objectives (Smith 2000; Mathias 1981; Janowitz 1983; King and Pomper 2004; Jenne 2007; Paul 2000). A more popular category of scholars today argues that local and transnational activism are not contradictory and that they potentiate each other (Jones-Correa 1998; Portes et al 2008; Smith 2007; Vertovec 2004, Escobar 2004; Itzigsohn 2008; Ostergaard-Nielson 2001; Guarnizo 2003; Jones-Correa 1998). A third strand suggests that immigrant interest groups are not actually interested in the immigrant community, the country of origin, or the U.S., but rather they are concerned with the political or economic interests of the leaders of the immigrant interest groups (Laguerre 2006; Downs 1957; Ost 2005; Whitt 1982; Michels 1911; Wright 2005). Finally, a fourth category of scholars suggests that, while any of the above factors may be the source of interest groups’ agendas, ideology, plays a role in conditioning the interpretation of the interests of the immigrant population, country of origin, and/or the U.S. into the actual policy platform (Rankin 2001; Gopoian et al 1984; Kurien 2007). These four strands may, at times, overlap in terms of their predictions of immigrant interest group behavior, however, they all differ in their analyses of the motives for such behavior.

The first set of scholars, which I will label the 5th column strand after Emilio Mola’s term for inhabitants of one country who are loyal to another, argues that immigrants and their political organizations are first accountable to their countries of origin (Smith 2000; Mathias 1981; Janowitz 1983; King and Pomper 2004; Jenne 2007; Paul 2000). Some of these scholars make the normative claim that immigrant, especially Hispanic, interest groups are a threat to U.S. national objectives because their influence distorts foreign policy to benefit
their countries of origin and at the expense of the U.S. (Smith 2000; Mathias 1981; Janowitz 1983).

Scholars in a separate segment of the 5th column strand do not make the same normative claim or generalizations, but through their selection bias (they only choose cases of groups advocating for the country of origin), appear to assume that immigrant interest groups are most concerned with their countries of origin (King and Pomper 2004; Jenne 2007; Paul 2000). Scholars of this second category do not ask whether the interest groups represent their countries of origin, but rather how they campaign on behalf of their countries of origin. While they do not claim that all immigrant groups represent their countries of origin, this second set of scholars does not seem to question that they do. Scholars of the 5th column strand might expect that a hypothetical immigrant interest group would lobby the U.S. government to sever ties with an allied country because of an offense the ally made against the immigrant group’s country of origin.

In general, the 5th column strand is useful because it highlights the contact that sometimes exists between immigrant interest group leaders and government officials in their country of origin. However, while immigrant interest groups do sometimes lobby on behalf of their countries of origin, scholars of this strand, especially in the first segment of the strand, generalize excessively about the loyalties of immigrant interest groups. Further research is necessary to confirm this assumption of the 5th column strand because it boldly contradicts the mission statements of most immigrant lobbies and fails to explain their domestic activities that do not affect the country of origin, such as health and education reform.

The second strand, political transnationalism, consists of scholars who hold that
immigrant interest groups can be concerned with the interests of both their immigrant community and their country of origin (Portes et al 2008; Jones-Correa 1998; Smith 2007; Escobar 2004; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001; Itzigsohn 2008; Guarnizo 2003). These scholars acknowledge that sometimes the organizations’ foreign policy platforms come from the requests of the government or people of the country of origin, not just from the immigrant community. Political transnationalism scholars also importantly see the formation of immigrant interest groups that lobby on behalf of the immigrant community and the country of origin as a step toward political incorporation into the U.S. They argue that immigrant political organizations that direct their focus toward their country of origin (an activity they have termed “political transnationalism”) tend to use the experience acquired through such political participation to simultaneously or eventually shift their political activity to domestic concerns, thus “giving immigrants greater voices in their adopted country.” They also hold that continued concern for the country of origin can help facilitate incorporation into the host country “by removing the stigma attached to renouncing old loyalties” (Smith 2007).

Political transnationalism has become a salient way to look at immigrant political activity. But scholars of this field have not yet looked at the actual interests behind such activity, instead assuming some mix of concern for the interests of immigrant communities and countries of origin. Guarnizo found that the immigrants who are most engaged in political transnationalism are wealthier, more educated, less marginal, better connected, and less recent arrivals than their fellow immigrants (Guarnizo 2003). These findings suggest the possibility that, while the interest groups share the country of origin with their immigrant community, their leaders differ in class and status and therefore may have different interests. Similarly, in her study of organizations that advocate for marginalized groups such as women
and African Americans, Strolovitch found that the leaders of the organizations often advocated mostly for issues pertaining to the elite minority of the constituency and framed those issues as affecting the majority of the constituency (Strolovitch 2007). While she did not look at immigrant interest groups, it is possible that the same trend applies to them – a possibility that political transnationalism scholars overlook.

Finally, in Ostergaard-Nielson’s study of the ways political institutions of the Netherlands and Germany impact the level of political transnationalism of Turkish immigrants there, she described a diverse collection of Turkish political organizations, which varied based on religious, ethnic, political, and ideological differences (Ostergaard-Nielson 2001). Her study makes it clear that, at least in the Turkish case, there is no monolithic Turkish immigrant interest or Turkish interest, as each group has a different agenda. However, as her study focuses on the political institutions in the receiving countries, more research is necessary to understand the diversity of the groups and where their different agendas come from. There has not been extensive analysis of the real interests of immigrant political organization leaders. The limitations of the political incorporation strand bring us the fourth strand of literature.

The self-interest category is a more loosely tied collection of scholars who might see immigrant interest group leaders as primarily concerned with advancing their own political or economic interests (Ost 2005; Wright 2005; Whitt 1982; Michels 1911). Ostergaard-Nielson cites an informant who told her that of the 1125 Turkish organizations in the Netherlands, “many of these are just ‘paper organizations,’ set up to attract funding or personal prestige by individuals” (Ostergaard-Nielson 2001). Besides Ostergaard-Nielson’s mention of personal status, no literature exists on the political or economic interests of the leaders of immigrant
interest groups, specifically. However, there is literature that looks at political interests of leaders of bureaucracies, such as Michels’s “iron law of oligarchy” (Michels 1911), and a multitude of literature that looks at the class interests of leaders of social movements, political parties, individuals, and government (Ost 2005; Whitt 1982; Wright 2005).

While these theories have not been extended to leaders of immigrant interest groups, it is possible to imagine that they might predict that the leaders of these groups would advocate for policies that would enhance their own political status, bureaucratic strength, or business or class interests. For example, the iron law of oligarchy scholars might predict that an interest group would advocate for foreign policy that is in line with U.S. objectives, even at the expense of the country of origin, in order to gain the trust of government officials and elevate the group’s status within the U.S. political sphere. The class interest theory of the self-interest strand might predict that an immigrant interest group would advocate for regressive taxes because they would benefit the elite leaders of the group and the business class, even though the immigrant community is mostly poor and would suffer from such a tax system. Scholars of the self-interest strand look at political activity in terms of individual or class gain for the actors, thus they might expect immigrant interest groups to be vehicles of personal or class interest.6

I turn to ideology, particularly free-market liberalism, as a related endogenous factor that impacts the agendas and discourse of Peruvian American political organizations. There is a large body of literature on the influence of conservative vs. liberal ideology on public and interest group positions (Rankin 2001; Gopoian 1984). While Ostergaard-Nielson

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6 For the purposes of this thesis, I use “self-interest” to mean either political self-interest, meaning the will to gain personal political influence, especially through running for office, or economic self-interest, meaning the desire to increase one’s wealth.
discusses in passing ideologically varied immigrant organizations in Germany and the Netherlands, she does not examine the sources or outcomes of their particular predispositions. The only analytical applications of ideology to immigrant interest groups are in terms of unifying nationalism (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Huntington 1977; Paul 2000; Kibria 1998), cleaving religious ideology (Kurien 2007), or conflicting party affiliations (Itzigsohn 2000; Kurien 2007). Therefore, I believe there are grounds to add political/economic ideology, namely free-market liberalism, to the list of possible sources of policy preferences of immigrant interest groups.

I suggest that the leaders’ ideology may be free-market liberalism, rather than merely conservative, because their groups seem to have supported pro-market candidates and policies such as bilateral trade agreements and business incubators, while also supporting policies that are not considered conservative, such as immigration reform. Furthermore, these mainstream groups have endorsed both Democratic and Republican candidates.

Hypotheses

To sum, if applied to the Peruvian American political organizations, the 5th column literature would predict that the organizations would act as agents of their countries of origin and therefore might have assisted Peru in negotiating a more fair USPTPA or might have been simply in favor of the Agreement. It would also inaccurately predict that the organizations would not be interested healthcare and education reform.

The political transnationalism scholars would not make a prediction about the specifics of the activities and discourses of the organizations. Instead they would simply see immigrant lobbies as engaging in a dialogue with the country of origin as they construct their
agendas. But these scholars might assume that the Peruvian American interest groups would be at least somewhat concerned with the immigrant community and the country of origin.

The *self-interest* literature would look at the organizations as vehicles of class interest or self-interest for the leaders and therefore might predict that the organizations would oppose taxes and support the USPTPA and other trade agreements because the leaders are wealthy and therefore might own businesses that would benefit from the Agreement. The literature might also predict that the organizations would oppose immigration reform and support the USPTPA because the former is in line with mainstream U.S. objectives and the latter is in line with both U.S. and Peruvian government objectives. The interest group leaders might choose those positions in the hopes of improving their political standing.

Finally, the *ideology* literature might predict that the organizations would advocate for pro-market policies such as tax cuts for businesses and trade promotion agreements, because free-market liberalism is likely the ideology of the leaders, given their class, education, and occupation.

The literature on immigrant interest groups (which does not include the *self-interest* or *free-market liberalism* literature) shows that such groups may advocate for the country of origin, the immigrant community, or both. However, it fails to identify a process through which immigrant interest groups lobby for the interests of the various groups and formulate a foreign policy agenda. It also fails to accurately predict the positions that Peruvian American political organizations would adopt toward the USPTPA and other issues. Therefore, I take a new approach to analyzing immigrant interest group behavior and apply the various types of *self-interest* and *free-market liberalism* theories to the groups.
Based on a survey of the literature, I expect to find evidence that the factors that mediate how interest groups develop their transnational and local policy platforms are more complicated than simply the perceived interests of the Peruvian community in the U.S. and/or Peru. I do not expect to find that any one of the above theories is the sole factor behind immigrant interest group agendas. Rather, I predict that I will find that serving the interests of Peruvians living in the U.S. is the stated and perhaps actual goal of the organizations, but that the political/economic self-interest and free-market liberalism of the interest group leaders impact the formation of their agendas.

In particular, I expect to find that economic/political self-interest will lead the organizations to support policies that would be good for the businesses they own and in line with U.S. objectives, thus good for their own political careers. And I expect their possible free-market liberalism to lead them to advocate for pro-market policies, such as trade promotion agreements, and to frame (and perhaps perceive) those policies as good for the entire Peruvian population in the U.S. The leaders of the organizations may genuinely believe that what is good for business is good for Peru and Peruvian Americans – this belief would be a manifestation of their ideology. And, finally, I expect to find some less ideological activity and discourse in the interest of Peruvians in the U.S., perhaps in the form of advocacy for immigration reform.

7 In my analysis, it may be difficult at times to distinguish between economic self-interest and free-market liberalism because leaders may make an argument that sounds ideological, but might only make that argument in order to frame a self-interested position as selfless. Therefore, I will sometimes argue that a statement or position indicates either economic self-interest or free-market liberalism, but that I cannot adjudicate between the two.
Value of findings

In order to fill the gap in the literature on immigrant political organizations, this thesis examines the mainstream Peruvian American interest groups in a disciplined interpretive case study. This type of case study “interprets or explains an event by applying a known theory [or multiple theories] to a new terrain” (Odell 2001). I chose to study the transnational and domestic policy agendas and discourses of the Peruvian American political organizations because there are few mainstream groups and therefore it is not difficult to assess each of them. The case is ideal for testing my hypothesis because the leaders, all of them fairly prominent businessmen and U.S. citizens, appear to come from a different demographic than much of the rest of the Peruvian population in the U.S. and therefore may possess distinct interests and ideology that are discernable from the interests and ideology of other Peruvians living in the U.S.

This thesis has academic implications for research on transnational politics and immigrant interest groups, as well as practical implications for immigrant group organizing and foreign and domestic policymaking at the legislative and executive levels. First, transnational politics literature and its various strands have yet to develop a generalizable theory about the role of self-interest or ideology in lobby agenda-setting and discourse.

Furthermore, scholars of political transnationalism see the creation and activities of immigrant interest groups as advancing the political incorporation of those immigrant groups and extending democratic involvement and voice to previously underrepresented groups. However, if this thesis were to find that the Peruvian American mainstream organizations are not giving voice to underrepresented Peruvians in the U.S. but rather to business and political interests, which are already represented by Chambers of Commerce, corporate lobbyists, and established political parties, then the claim that immigrant interest groups help previously
underrepresented communities enter U.S. politics may not always be the case. By neglecting to analyze the motivations and backstories for the transnational agendas of these interest groups, scholars in the political transnationalism field may misjudge the impact of such groups, at least in the case of Peruvians in the U.S. These scholars predict that such groups expand political incorporation, but perhaps the groups also (or only) strengthen existing class and economic divisions.

Additionally, policymakers might benefit from this study because they meet with immigrant lobbies in order to learn what their immigrant constituencies want. If the lobbies do not adequately or accurately represent those constituencies, then policymakers could get a distorted idea of what foreign and domestic policies their constituencies want them to support. For example, when the Haitian American lobby speaks to a candidate, there is a mutual understanding that the lobby represents the Haitian American community and that if the candidate makes promises to the PAC, he or she will win the community’s votes (Laguerre 1998). But I aim to challenge and complicate the scholarly and otherwise assumption that immigrant lobbies aim first to represent their immigrant group. If the Peruvian American political organizations do not only represent Peruvian Americans, then the assumption that immigrant lobbies represent their immigrant group is discredited. It is a case for looking at the influence of political self-interest and ideology among interest group elites.

This leads to the question of immigrant organizing. If it is indeed the case that the distinct demographic of the leaders of immigrant lobbies leads them to work for interests other than those of the immigrant community, then perhaps there needs to be a more participatory mechanism for immigrants to voice their opinions to the lobbies or to some
other organization that is in contact with politicians. It is important that immigrant communities’ transnational policy opinions be heard, not only for the sake of the immigrant communities but also for the sake of the citizens of their country of origin. Unlike interest group elites, who are mostly in contact with governments and bureaucratic organizations in the country of origin, non-elite immigrants are in contact with ordinary citizens—their family and friends—back in their country of origin (Sheffer 2003). American politicians already know what the governments and bureaucratic organizations of other countries want. What they do not know is what the people of those countries want. Perhaps immigrant communities can provide that information if the mechanisms are put in place.

Some limitations of my thesis are that my findings may only apply to immigrant lobbies that are relatively new and free from major social, political, or economic constraints. For example, immigrant lobbies emerging from refugee groups might be less interested in status and more interested in helping and then returning to their country of origin. Another limitation of my thesis is that my research on the views of non-member Peruvian Americans is insufficient. It is impossible for me to interview a large and random enough sample of Peruvians in the U.S. to make any claim about the entire population. The last limitation is that I may be unable to investigate all the factors that go into the organizations’ foreign and domestic policy decision-making process. There are probably other factors such as university study or organizations abroad that I cannot research.

Methodology

To answer my research questions, I conducted face to face and telephone interviews of the leaders of the Peruvian American political organizations, PAPAC, PANR, and PAPO,
as well as INDECAPI, TIKSI Group, and the Peruvian American Chamber of Commerce of Florida. The interviews were based on the semi-structured format outlined by Desai and Potter and the World Bank guide to semi-structured interviews (Desai 2006; World Bank 2010). Please see Appendix A for the interview guidelines.

The purpose of the interviews was to learn how the Peruvian American organizations set and justify their transnational and domestic policy agendas, to whom are they accountable, and how they interact with those to whom they are accountable. I asked how the leaders of the organizations decided to support their policies. I asked the leaders to explain the missions of their organizations and the groups to which they are accountable, i.e. the communities they say they represent, the other organizations with which they collaborate, the ties they have to people, organizations, or political parties in Peru. I asked how they explain their choice of agenda. And I asked for personal information that could shed light on the sources of potential political predisposition and private interests. I also used my interviews with leaders of INDECAPI and TIKSI Group to get an idea of some alternative views within the Peruvian American community that are not represented by the mainstream organizations. I then transcribed all my interviews and used content analysis and close reading to identify the stated and implied objectives, ideologies, and interests of the leaders of the organizations. I was able to record all interviews except for my conversations with a leader of INDECAPI, who asked not to be recorded. However I was able to take notes during the conversation.

Scheduling interviews with the leaders of the mainstream organizations was a challenge because, in addition to their roles in these groups, they also are involved in other organizations, own businesses, and sometimes travel to Peru. However, once I was able to get a hold of them, they were happy to talk to me. I ensured that their answers are reliable by
crosschecking them with my other research. I make note in the thesis of areas in which I found contradictions, for example in the leaders’ claims as to the impact of their lobbying on politicians.

I did content analysis and close reading of the literature that the organizations produce and newspaper articles in which they were cited. The value of such analysis for my research is that it helped me understand to whom the organizations think they are accountable, who they are trying to convince, and how they see their positions, based on the ways they justify and frame their positions. Content analysis was based loosely on the methods employed by Hook and Pu in their analysis of newspaper coverage of the 2001 spy plane crisis (Hook and Pu 2001). I used this method to look at every relevant statement by the organizations and to identify their various stated aims and their justifications for their positions. For the close reading, I selected several newspaper articles, interviews, and public announcements that the organizations wrote or contributed to and I analyzed them using Melanie Kill’s methods (Kill 2006). I attempted to identify the stated missions and constituencies of the organizations. By looking closely at their justifications for their particular activities, I also tried to identify unstated constituencies, interests, and other factors that may go into the organizations’ agendas.

I also gathered information from the websites of and articles on collaborating organizations and the politicians whom the political organizations have endorsed. I looked for their positions on the issues that are in the mainstream Peruvian American organizations’ agendas. And I managed to interview an aid to one endorsed candidate, Representative David Rivera.
I structure my thesis as follows: the second chapter provides some statistics on Peru and Peruvians and a brief history of recent events in Peru and Peruvian immigration. Chapter 3 will analyze the ways in which the leaders of the mainstream Peruvian American political organizations describe their groups. Research will be based on content analysis and close reading of their websites, publications, and quotations in newspaper articles, as well as interviews with the leaders.

Chapter’s 4 and 5 will look at the same data as chapter 3 and test whether the organizations’ actions meet their stated self-descriptions and the assumptions of the scholarly literature. To that end, the chapters will examine in greater detail the agendas of the mainstream organizations and analyze the organizations’ defense of their positions, particularly their support of the USPTPA, using content analysis and close reading, and will look at the backgrounds of the leaders, positions of endorsed candidates, the organizations with which the mainstream groups collaborate, and the ways the organizations describe Peruvians and Peruvian Americans who disagree with their agendas. Chapter 4 will use this analysis to find evidence for the impact of self-interest and free-market liberalism on the organizations’ agendas, while chapter 5 will look for evidence for the impact of concern for Peru, Peruvian Americans, and increasing their political participation. And Chapter 6 contains conclusions based on my research, a discussion of the value of my findings, and suggestions for further research.
Chapter 2 – Peru, Peruvians, and Peruvian immigrants

Relevant background information for this analysis

This chapter provides some background information that will help understand the analysis in the subsequent chapters. I first provide statistics on Peruvians in the U.S. and Peru. Next, I provide a brief timeline of events around which the Peruvian American lobby has organized or spoken publicly, namely the USPTPA, the 2006 Peruvian general elections, the 2007 earthquake, and Temporary Protection Status.

Peruvians

The Republic of Peru is a Latin American country rich in natural resources and diverse geography. While its largest exports are copper, gold, zinc, textiles, and fishmeal, farming is an integral part of Peru’s economy.8 Peru used to be the leading producer of the coca leaf, but largely due to U.S. “war on drugs,” production has fallen and Peru is now

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second to Colombia. Today Peru’s main export crops, produced mostly by big businesses, are asparagus, mangoes, and artichokes. Its traditional crops, which provide the majority of the supply in Peru, are corn, cotton, and rice. These crops are produced by small, mostly subsistence, farmers, who make up 30% of Peru’s workforce.9

Peru has a population of 28 million and a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of about $8,600 (compared to the U.S. GDP per capita of $47,000). In the 1950s and 1960s, Peru, along with most of Latin America, pursued import substitution industrialization and its GDP grew at a rage of 3% per year. In the 1980s, the Peruvian economy experienced the same collapse as the rest of Latin America. In the 1990s, Peru got back on track and its growth has been increasing since 1990, with tremendous growth in recent years. In 2007, real GDP growth reached 9.8%, higher than China’s growth that year. Since the recent global economic crisis, Peru’s growth has fallen to 4%, which is still a relatively high. Despite this remarkable growth, about 35% of Peruvians live below the poverty line (less than $2 per day) and about 20% live in extreme poverty (less than $1 per day). Most of the poor live in rural areas. Peru has a very large informal sector, which in 2006 constituted almost 80% of labor.10

According to the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) conducted in 2008, there are approximately 550,000 people of Peruvian origin living in the U.S., making it the 10th largest Hispanic population or 1% of the entire Hispanic population. This population is three times what it was in 1990. It is estimated that 34,000 Peruvians migrated to the U.S. in the 1970’s, 83,000 in the 1980’s, 117,000 in the 1990’s, and 143,000 between 2000 and

2008 (Bergad 2010). However the Peruvian Embassy says that, based on its surveys in 2007, 2008, and 2010, the number of Peruvians in the U.S. is actually over one million, higher than the ACS count because many undocumented immigrants were not reported.\textsuperscript{11}

![Graph showing growth of the Peruvian population in the U.S. (Bergad 2010)](image)

About 26\% of Peruvians in the U.S. live in New York and New Jersey; 17\% live in California, and 19\% live in Florida (Bergad 2010). After Miami, and New York, Paterson, New Jersey, is the city with the third largest population of Peruvians living in the U.S.\textsuperscript{12} Because Paterson is a relatively small city, Peruvians are quite visible there and even have a strip of Peruvian-owned businesses known as “Little Lima.” Peruvians own half of the city’s 2,800 Hispanic-owned businesses (Llorente 2009). The population in Paterson is large enough that Peru has placed one of its 13 consulates there, despite the fact that the consulate

\textsuperscript{11} Peruvian Embassy 2010.  
\textsuperscript{12} Peruvian Embassy 2010.
in New York is only 30 minutes away. Thus, Paterson was a useful location to gather information on Peruvians living in the U.S. for this study.

About 60% of the 550,000 Peruvians counted in the 2008 ACS are U.S. citizens (29% of Peruvians in the U.S. are citizens by birth, 32% by naturalization). About 75% were born abroad – twice the percentage of Hispanics born abroad. And about 66% of Peruvians in the U.S. arrived since 1990 (Bergad 2010). According to the Peruvian Embassy, 17% of Peruvians in the U.S. have lived in the U.S. between 1 and 5 years, 33% between 5 and 10 years, and 40% over 10 years. This indicates that Peruvians are a relatively recent population in the U.S. and that most are first- or second-generation immigrants.

Only half of Peruvians in the U.S. speak English proficiently, according to the ACS, and only 1/3, according to the Peruvian Embassy. But 32% have earned at least a bachelor’s
degree, which is more than twice the percentage of all Hispanics who have earned a bachelor’s degree, and 51% of U.S.-born Peruvians have a bachelor’s degree.\(^{13}\)

Peruvian median individual income in the U.S. is about $24,000 (which is slightly lower than the U.S. population median and slightly higher than all other Hispanic medians except Colombian), and household income is $64,000.\(^{14}\) Only 8% of Peruvian households in the U.S. live on under $20,000 annually, while 40% of households earn over $75,000 annually and 26% earn over $100,000 annually. The poverty rate among Peruvians in the U.S. is 10%, which is the same as the non-Hispanic white poverty rate (Bergad 2010). However, because this information is only based on the 550,000 Peruvians in the U.S. counted by the ACS, it is likely that most of the hundreds of thousands of undocumented Peruvians that may reside in the U.S. were born in Peru and do not speak English proficiently and may have lower levels of income and education.

The studies cited in this chapter did not generally focus on the interests of Peruvians in the U.S. But the Peruvian Embassy asked its participants a useful question for this thesis: “What are your principal concerns in the U.S.?” Participants could mark more than one option. 41% marked “employment” and 27% marked “immigration status.” “Language,” “discrimination,” “loneliness/depression,” and “other” got about 10% each. Another question that can point to interests is “What is your immigration status in the U.S.?” Nearly 60% said they were citizens or permanent residents, but over 20% said they had exceeded their permitted time here. Also interesting is that nearly 90% of participants reported that they do not belong to an organization of Peruvians in the U.S. And over 66% said that they plan to

\(^{13}\) Pew Hispanic Center 2009.  
\(^{14}\) Pew Hispanic Center 2009.
return to live in Peru. Finally, the Peruvian Embassy found in 2010 that 234,500 or 23% of Peruvians in the U.S. are registered to vote in Peru.\textsuperscript{15}

\textit{Timeline: Trade and tragedy}

A number of events within the last 20 years relate to issues in the agendas of the mainstream Peruvian American lobby. The Andean Trade Preference Act strengthened U.S.-Peru ties and also led to the creation of export industries in Peru, which in turn led to Peru’s support of the USPTPA.\textsuperscript{16} During the process of passing the USPTPA, Peruvian elections took place, with a tight race between Humala and García. García, more friendly to the U.S. and supportive of the USPTPA, won. The Peruvian lobby, which supported the USPTPA, welcomed his victory. A year later, an earthquake struck Peru and the Peruvian lobby launched relief efforts and advocacy of Temporary Protection Status for Peruvians. After the USPTPA was implemented and TPS failed, the lobby focused on helping businesses to take advantage of the Agreement. The Bagua massacre was the most violent episode since the height of the Shining Path. While it was a result of the USPTPA and the García administration and while a number of other Peruvian American organizations mobilized in response, the mainstream organizations did not respond.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{15} Peruvian Embassy 2010.  
\textsuperscript{16} Important to understanding Peru’s decision to pass the USPTPA in 2006 is the fact that the ratification coincided with the expiration of the Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act of 2002. The 2002 Act and its predecessor, the Andean Trade Preference Act of 1991, were U.S. unilateral trade preference acts that removed U.S. trade barriers to licit Peruvian goods and required nothing of Peru. A major component of the U.S.’s war on drugs, the two Acts were implemented as incentive for legitimate exports and eradicate coca farming in Peru. Under the ATPDEA, in 2005, “44\% of U.S. imports from Peru received preferential duty treatment” and “U.S. imports from Peru have been increasing significantly since 1996, from $1.26 billion in 1996 to $5.12 billion in 2005, over a 300\% increase.” According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Acts also provided new jobs to Peruvians, increased U.S. imports from Peru by 40\%, reduced drug trafficking and, in so doing, reduced Shining Path violence (USTR 2007). Thus, were the ATPDEA to expire, the Peruvian export industries it had made possible would lose their market and the Peruvian economy would likely suffer greatly.}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct, 2002</td>
<td>Bush renews program as Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>April, 2006</td>
<td>US President Bush and Peru President Toledo sign the USPTPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>June, 2006</td>
<td>Peruvian national election</td>
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<tr>
<td>June, 2006</td>
<td>Runoff election between Alan García and Ollanta Humala, García wins</td>
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<tr>
<td>July, 2006</td>
<td>Peruvian Congress ratifies USPTPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec, 2006</td>
<td>ATPDEA set to expire, but is extended until June 2007 and again until February 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>July, 2007</td>
<td>Earthquake strikes Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov, 2007</td>
<td>US House ratifies USPTPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec, 2007</td>
<td>US Senate ratifies USPTPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan, 2009</td>
<td>Bush signs proclamation to implement the USPTPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June, 2009</td>
<td>Bagua massacre</td>
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**Timeline of relevant events**

The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement is a bilateral trade agreement between the U.S. and Peru. Intended to eliminate “barriers to goods and services, promote economic growth, and expand trade between the two countries,” the USPTPA makes permanent the duty-free access of Peru’s exports to the U.S. market and requires that Peru reciprocate by opening its market to U.S. exports. Prior to the Agreement, the Peruvian government placed tariffs of 5-20% on imports from the U.S. to protect its market and raise revenue.\(^\text{17}\)

Once the USPTPA was implemented, Peru was to immediately eliminate tariffs on 80% of U.S. exports of consumer and industry goods and on 2/3 of U.S. farm exports. The remainder of Peru’s tariffs is to be reduced within 10 to 15 years. The Agreement demands that Peru reciprocate the U.S.’s openness in other areas as well. It requires that Peru offer U.S. firms equal opportunity to procure Peruvian government sectors. It protects U.S. firms in Peru against “anti-competitive behavior.” It sets standards that Peru must follow to protect

U.S. Intellectual Property Rights. And it sets standards of labor rights and environmental protection for the two countries to follow.\textsuperscript{18}

Trade representatives from the two countries signed the Agreement on April 12, 2006, just three days after the first round of the Peruvian general election. The top contenders to replace Alejandro Toledo as president were Lourdes Flores, Alan García, and Ollanta Humala. Flores, considered the most conservative of the candidates, was especially popular among Peruvian voters in the U.S.\textsuperscript{19} García was considered moderate-left and was running to serve a second, non-consecutive term after an economically disastrous four years in the late 1980’s. Humala, the leader of the 2000 uprising against then-president Alberto Fujimori and friend of President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, was considered the more left-leaning candidate. All three initially supported the USPTPA, though Humala said he would renegotiate the Agreement if elected, and later came to oppose it in his campaign.

Flores came in third and neither García nor Humala earned half the votes, so they participated in a runoff in early June. Humala earned 47\% of the runoff votes and Garcia won the election with 52\%. Several weeks later, the Peruvian Congress ratified the USPTPA and awaited the U.S. Congress vote.

A year later, in August 2007, an earthquake hit the central coast of Peru, with its epicenter 93 miles south of Lima. In total, 519 people were killed and 1,366 were wounded.


58,581 houses were destroyed, leading to a sizeable number of refugees. In response, many Peruvians living in the U.S. collected funds and supplies for the victims of the earthquake.

Another way that some Peruvians in the U.S. responded was to ask the U.S. government to extend Temporary Protection Status (TPS) to Peruvians. The Secretary of Homeland Security may designate a country eligible for TPS if it has “conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country's nationals from returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately.” Then the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) “may grant TPS to eligible nationals of certain countries (or parts of countries), who are already in the United States.” TPS is granted for a period, during which immigrants from that country “are not removable from the United States, cannot be detained by DHS, can obtain an employment authorization document (EAD),” and “may apply for travel authorization.” Currently, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Somalia, and Sudan have TPS.

While the U.S. did not end up granting Peruvians TPS, the U.S. Congress did ratify the USPTPA, with the House voting in favor of it in November 2007 and then the Senate in December 2007. In the House, Democrats were split in half, in Senate, 29-17. Republicans were almost unanimously in support of the Agreement.

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21 “USCIS - Temporary Protected Status,” USCIS Home Page, Web. 13 Mar. 2011 <http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=848f7f2ef0745210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=848f7f2ef0745210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD>.
In January 2009, Bush signed the proclamation to implement the USPTPA and on February 1 the Agreement was officially implemented.

Four months later, 5,000 people, led by indigenous groups in Bagua, Peru, protested several decrees that García issued in order to comply with the recently implemented USPTPA. The protestors said that the decrees would enable foreign companies, particularly mining and oil companies, to exploit the natural resources in the Amazon, where the indigenous live and hold territorial rights. On June 5th and 6th, police and protestors clashed and at least 34 indigenous civilians and 9 policemen were killed, and at least 150 people were wounded. The Peruvian congress eventually repealed the controversial decrees.
Chapter 3 – Immigrant lobbies in the mirror

Self–descriptions of Peruvian American Political Action Committee of New Jersey (PAPAC), Peruvian American Organizations USA (PAPO), and Peruvian American National Roundtable (PANR)

Introduction

Because the existing literature on immigrant interest groups does not adequately analyze the motivations behind the Peruvian American political organizations’ platforms, it is necessary to investigate the groups empirically. Perhaps the best way to understand the motivations of the leaders of a group is to analyze what those leaders have written, said, and done in their role as leaders of the organization. Therefore, I will discuss the publications and other statements produced by the leaders of these groups and the interviews I conducted with them.

This chapter looks at the self-descriptions of the mainstream Peruvian American political organizations. I begin with the self-descriptions because they will provide an idea of the ways the leaders see themselves and their organizations, the image the leaders want to project of their organizations, and a standard to hold them to when evaluating the activities and platforms of the groups. In the next two chapters, I will look at their personal backgrounds and organizational activities, platforms, endorsed candidates, and coalition members to test my hypotheses and evaluate whether the groups in fact hold up to their descriptions and missions.

In this chapter, I find that the mainstream Peruvian American political organizations state that they are concerned with the interests and participation of all Peruvians living in the
U.S. and the interests of Peruvians in Peru. The leaders see their groups as representatives of most, if not all, of the Peruvians living in the U.S. In no part of the groups’ self-descriptions do they say that one of their aims is to advance their own individual business interests or political status. Nor do I find any indication that the leaders are aware of or admit if they possess a particular ideology. However PANR does conflate serving businesses with representing Peruvian Americans, which suggests free-market liberalism.

The data for this chapter, as well as the subsequent two chapters, consists of all relevant materials from the websites of the organizations of interest, newsletters and press releases issued by the organizations of interest, newspaper articles online and in print, fliers online and found in Paterson, New Jersey, and telephone and in-person interviews. I found all English-language articles archived online that mentioned the organizations by searching for the organizations, the names of the leaders, and “Peruvian American” in LexisNexis. Most of the relevant articles came from The Herald News of Passaic County, New Jersey, and The Record of Bergen County, New Jersey.

From gathering materials in Peruvian-owned shops in Paterson, New Jersey, and asking my contacts, I identified only one Spanish-language print newspaper that extensively covers Peruvian and Peruvian American politics – Ayllu Times. I visited the archives of the bimonthly newspaper and copied all articles between 2006 and 2009 that mentioned any Peruvian American political organization. I collected the rest of the data through visits to Paterson, New Jersey, and Google and LexisNexis searches of the organizations and their leaders, and semi-structured interviews with the leaders of the organizations on the telephone and in person.
Mapping out the mainstream lobby

Logos of PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR
(www.peruvianamericans.com; www.papousa.net; www.panr.us)

The organizations that make up the mainstream Peruvian American lobby category are the Peruvian American Political Action Committee of New Jersey (PAPAC), Peruvian American Organizations USA (PAPO), and the Peruvian American National Roundtable (PANR). To qualify as part of the “mainstream lobby” in this study, an organization must (a) endorse candidates for office, (b) meet with politicians to advocate on behalf of Peruvians in the U.S., and (c) be in the public eye (i.e. receive newspaper coverage). These three are the only organizations that meet those requirements.22

PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR endorse American candidates for office and have been part of coalitions that have contributed funds to campaigns. Their endorsements are based on candidates’ platforms regarding issues pertaining to foreign policy with Peru, immigration policy, and domestic social services and taxes, policies pertaining to business, as well as general closeness with the Peruvian American community. The three organizations have met with candidates and elected officials in formal and informal settings. They were staunch supporters of the U.S. – Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (USPTPA) and have organized

22 Peruvian American Coalition of Miami and Peruvian American Political Alliance of New Jersey may also meet the qualifications, but receive less news coverage and I could not find evidence that they endorsed candidates and I was unable to speak with their leaders. But they are part of PAPO and so will be included in the analysis of that organization.
and attended events and written to policymakers in support of the USPTPA, as well as immigration reform and Temporary Protection Status (TPS) for Peruvians. The organizations have also held informational conferences to help businesses and to help Peruvians understand U.S. citizenship. And they raised funds and goods for the victims of the 2007 earthquake in Peru.

PAPAC was created in 2003 by a handful of Peruvian New Jerseyans. Its leadership consists of a president, Norberto Curitomai, and a board of directors. All the leaders are Americans of Peruvian decent. Most leaders are businesspeople and several have run for local office. The website of the organization, www.peruvianamericans.com, goes back and forth between Spanish and English. PAPAC’s stated mission is to support candidates and encourage political participation that will benefit the Peruvian American community. While the mission statement does not mention Peruvians in Peru, other statements made by the organization have expressed a commitment to Peru. For example, the organization’s 2007 newsletter defends the USPTPA only in terms of the impact it will have on Peru and not on Peruvian Americans.

Peruvian American Political Organizations USA (PAPO) is a coalition consisting of PAPAC, Peruvian American Political Alliance of New Jersey, and eight “Peruvian American Coalitions” from various states. I spoke with the leaders of the Utah/Idaho and Virginia

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23 Curitomai also has a website, called www.curito.com, in which he displays articles on and by PAPAC and PAPO. Curitomai’s website also goes back and forth between Spanish and English.

24 The mission statement of PAPAC is displayed in English above the Spanish version on their bilingual website as, “Our mission by focusing on politics, is to support candidates, both current and future. Who will work for the benefit of our committee [community in the Spanish version]. We will unify the necessary resources, create a database, and stimulate [encourage in the Spanish version] education and participation in the political process, building respect of our rights as residents of the United States.” The Spanish version says, “La Misión del comité es enfocarse en la Política, apoyando a los actuales y futuros candidatos que trabajen en beneficio de nuestra comunidad; y de reunir los recursos necesarios para crear un banco de datos e incentivar la educación y participación en la político, haciendo respetar nuestros derechos como residentes de los Estados Unidos.”
“PAC’s” and it appears that, perhaps with the exception of PAC-Miami, which advocates for immigration reform, the Peruvian American Coalitions are not political but rather they aim to help Peruvians in the U.S. become accustomed to U.S. citizenship. However, combined, these organizations form PAPO, which defines itself as a “political organization that would work in the total benefit of our Peruvian American community” and encourage political participation among Peruvian Americans. PAPO is currently headed by the same Norberto Curitomai of PAPAC, however his predecessor was Sergio Massa, the president of the Peruvian American Coalition of Miami.

The organization’s website and www.curito.com show that PAPO has had several national meetings in Washington, DC, where its leaders met with U.S. and Peruvian government officials and members of Chambers of Commerce and model lobbies, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The main issue displayed on the organization’s website is TPS for Peruvians, however newspaper articles and www.curito.com show that the organization campaigned heavily for immigration reform and the USPTPA and is currently supporting the free trade agreement between the U.S. and Colombia.

The Peruvian American National Roundtable seems to have an explicit dual goal of serving all Peruvian Americans and all business interests. Its website states that the organization seeks “to bring together the different voices of all people of Peruvian origin in the United States” and also that the organization has “been serving the business community

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25 These 8 groups call themselves “PAC’s”, but these “Peruvian American Coalitions” are not political action committees, despite the identical acronym.

26 The organization’s website, http://papousa.net/index.html, states, “Nuestra misión es crear una organización política que trabaje para el beneficio total de nuestra comunidad peruana Americana, estimulando la educación, participación e integración socio-política de nuestras comunidades en la vida diaria de los Estados Unidos de Norte América. (Our mission is to create a strong political organization that would work in the total benefit of our Peruvian American community; stimulating social and political education, participation and integration of our communities in the everyday development of United States of America).”
individually and [is] aspiring to promote economic development at the national level”. However, whenever PANR is cited in another website, press release, letter, or newspaper article, only the first mission statement is given, indicating that it may be the primary goal that PANR wants to convey.

The organization is headed by Daniel Jara, a prominent Paterson businessman, who is featured in numerous newspaper articles on Peruvian Americans in general and is also the president of the Statewide Hispanic Chamber of Commerce of New Jersey. PANR has a board of directors, two of whom are displayed as working in “important positions” in PepsiCo and AT&T. The organization displays support of the USPTPA and also has advice for Peruvian American businesses seeking to benefit from the implementation of the Agreement. The organization does not appear to have been involved in the push for immigration reform, but it set up a charity to provide for the victims of the earthquake in Peru. The organization displays the agenda for its last forum, which was on international investment and trade and consisted of sessions for small businesses to benefit from the USPTPA.

The statements and make-up of PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR qualify them for the study as they all seek to serve the Peruvian American community. More than seek to serve, these organizations also seek to represent Peruvian Americans, as shown in a 2008 letter to Bush published on PAPAC’s website and signed by PAPO: “The 1 million Peruvians living

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27 PANR’s website, www.panr.us, is in English and Spanish and states on its homepage, “We have been serving the business community individually and we are aspiring to promote economic development at the national level. Our organization is young but innovative. We do not require that you belong to any particular affiliation or possess any previous memberships to join our organization.” Its “about us” link states, “The Peruvian-American National Roundtable (PANR) is a private, non-partisan, non-profit corporation seeking to bring together the different voices of all people of Peruvian origin in the United States. PANR is a national forum for analysis, planning, and action to advance the economic, educational, legal, social, cultural, and political interests of Peruvian Americans. PANR aims to ensure for U.S. Peruvians the full exercise of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution of the United States of America.”
in the United States and their relatives in Peru are grateful for everything your Administration has done for Peru during your eight years as President.” Here, the organizations are telling Bush, as representatives of all Peruvians living in the U.S., that they are all grateful to him. Having provided a brief description of the organizations, I now analyze the ways the leaders describe these groups.

_Taking the lobby at face value_

Loosely following the content analysis methods employed by Hook and Pu (2006), I scanned the publications, statements, and websites of the organizations and transcripts of my interviews with the leaders for descriptions of the organizations and their missions and, for each article, put an “X” in the corresponding category in the table. Please see Appendix B for a more detailed explanation of my methodology.

The tables below show the results of content analysis of the PAPAC’s 9 instances of stated goals and missions, PAPO’s 5 instances, and PANR’s 5 instances. The totals at the bottom of the tables show the number of times each goal/mission was stated. Below the totals are the percentages of each stated goal/mission of all the instances of stated goal/mission.

Table 1: Goals/Missions of PAPAC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Advocating for Per-Am’s</th>
<th>Increasing Per-Am pol involvement</th>
<th>Helping Peru</th>
<th>Raising org’s profile</th>
<th>Supporting business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The results of content analysis show that the leaders of all three organizations say that they aim advocate for Peruvians in the U.S. and increase their political participation, help Peru, raise their organizations profiles, and support businesses. The tables show that advocating for Peruvians in the U.S. and increasing their political involvement are the most frequently stated focus of all three groups. Besides PAPAC’s more pronounced interest in raising its own profile, the there was a fairly even distribution of other interests – helping Peru and supporting business - within each of the three groups.
PAPAC seems to emphasize increasing Peruvian American political involvement and advocating for the community. Leaders of the organization use strong language to describe these aspects of their mission, such as “…support the participation of Peruvian and Latinos in politics in the United States” and “…always trying our best to respond to our community’s needs”. However, the group’s emphases on the other concerns are not far behind. PAPO expressed more interest in increasing Peruvian American political participation than PANR.

PAPO and PANR’s concerns are also apparently evenly spread, with an emphasis on advocating for Peruvians living in the U.S. PANR made this clear with statements such as, “seeking to bring together the different voices of all people of Peruvian origin in the United States” and “interested in generating an approximation of the different voices of the community of origin Peruvian-American living in the U.S.” while it also uniquely expressed explicit concern for business interests: “We have been serving the business community individually and we are aspiring to promote economic development at the national level”.

PAPO also emphasized advocating for Peruvian Americans with statements such as, “On behalf of all Peruvians who live in this country…” The only factor that did not receive much attention was “helping Peru,” which was only mentioned once in each group’s various self-descriptions. This result may be due to a lack of concern for Peru or it may be due to a desire to hide concerns for Peru given possible perceived distrust of immigrant loyalties.

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Based on the methods described by Melanie Kill (2006), I also conduct a close reading of the three organizations’ descriptions of their constitution, mission, and motivations in a newspaper article and two interview transcripts. I code for indications of concern for Peru, Peruvian Americans, and increasing their political involvement in the language used. The newspaper article about PAPO and titled, “Peruvian immigrants seek more political clout; national alliance makes local activism top priority,” was published in the Herald News of Passaic County, New Jersey, in August 2007. The article contains a number of long quotations from the leaders of PAPO. I also use relevant sections of an interview I conducted with Norberto Curitomai, the president of PAPO and PAPAC, and of an interview with Daniel Jara, the president of PANR.

To preview, close reading of the three sources largely confirmed the findings of content analysis described above. The leaders of the organizations indeed emphasized advocacy for Peruvian Americans as their primary aim, though increasing Peruvian American political activity may have been even more important to PAPO and PAPAC. As in content analysis, concern for Peru was present but was actively downplayed.

*Increasing political participation: “A new awakening”*

While there was little mention of it in my interview with Daniel Jara of PANR, increasing the political involvement of Peruvians in the U.S. appeared to be the focus for PAPAC and PAPO. In the Herald News article, Aristo Carranza, a leader of PAPO, states,

The main goal is to move from the shadows, and in our community the shadow is politics...This is a new awakening in our country – it’s time for us to be involved.

Later in the article, Curitomai adds, "We are asking people to get more involved in the political field, no matter where they live." Curitomai and Carranza say that Peruvian
Americans are not visible or involved enough in American politics and that PAPO is the beginning of Peruvian American participation and visibility. Curitomai laments the lack of Peruvian American participation to date, saying that “We’re still looking to Peru like our home,” but that “the mentality is changing,” presumably referring to himself and his colleagues founding PAPO. And he adds that These statements contain the explicit goal of increasing the community’s political involvement in the U.S.

The sentiment was echoed in my interview about PAPAC with its leader, Curitomai, in which he responded to a question about the group’s goals with, “We keep our culture from Peru and then we have to integrated it, we have to educate ourselves and participate in the political causes in the U.S.” Curitomai later adds, “Besides endorsing candidates, what we do is to bring our current generations, Peruvian descendents candidates to have in positions, to bring some Peruvian descendents to office,” further demonstrating the group’s concern for increasing the community’s political involvement. Daniel Jara, the leader of PANR, seemed to be less interested in Peruvian American political activity, though he did mention it once towards the end of the interview: “We also try to help Peruvian Americans to be the rightful seat as government officials in decision-making positions in the government of the US.” These statements from Carranza, Curitomai, and Jara show a desire to increase Peruvian American political participation in U.S. politics.

“To improve the Peruvian American’s life”

Close reading also shows that the leaders say they are concerned with advocating in the interest of Peruvians living in the U.S., even going as far as to say that they are

33 Curitomai also adds in the article, “PAPO’s main focus will be on getting Peruvians more involved in their own communities in the U.S., from running for local office to educating newcomers on the American political system.”
representatives of the population of Peruvians living in the U.S. In the article on PAPO, Curitomai says that Peruvian in the U.S. should be concerned with “whatever decision is taken that affects our kids’ education, the taxes on our house, etc.” These are domestic issues that pertain to Peruvian Americans. The article also states that the first part of PAPO’s “dual purpose” is “to raise the profile of the Peruvian community in local U.S. politics.” In my interview about PAPAC, even before mentioning increasing Peruvian American political activity, Curitomai said that the organization seeks “to educate and to improve the Peruvian American’s life in the U.S.” This statement and his explanation for endorsements, “We mostly supported the candidates that are supporting our needs, our concerns, issues like immigration, education, opportunity for our community,” show Curitomai’s stated concern for advancing the interests of Peruvians living in the U.S.

Jara also portrays advancing Peruvian American interests as the primary goal for PANR. When asked about the mission of the organization, Jara read from a sheet of paper,

PANR is a national forum for analysis, planning, and action to advance economic, educational, legal, social, cultural, and political interests of Peruvian Americans. PANR aims to ensure for US Peruvians the full exercise of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution of the United States of America.

This description shows that PANR is primarily concerned with advancing the interests of Peruvians living in the U.S. Similarly, Jara said that PANR endorsed candidates who “have been very good friends of the Peruvian American community in Florida” and “we advocate for candidates that are connected in any way, shape, or form for supporting the Peruvian American community.” It is thus evident that the leaders of the three organizations present their groups as advocates of Peruvian living in the U.S.

Interestingly, the leaders of the three organizations do not only present themselves as advocates of Peruvian in the U.S.; they present themselves as representatives of their entire
immigrant community. This finding is significant because it may affect the way that politicians and others interpret the needs and desires of all Peruvians living in the U.S. Leaders of PAPO say that they represent the entire Peruvian American community with statements such as, “On behalf of all Peruvians who live in this country,” made in letters sent to Bush and García. Similarly, PANR describes itself in an Ayllu Times article as “interested in generating an approximation of the different voices of the community of Peruvian American origin living in the U.S.,” and its website states that the organization seeks “to bring together the different voices of all people of Peruvian origin in the United States,” suggesting that PANR believes itself to be the voice of Peruvian Americans, as does PAPO.34

The fact that these leaders attempt to speak for Peruvians living in the U.S. is complicated by the fact that the leaders of the groups acknowledge but do not address differences of interests within the Peruvian American community. When asked about instances in which disagreements are voiced from Peruvian Americans, Curitomai replied, “Yes, we have the people that sometimes they don’t agree 100% with us. You know, as a community we have to accept that, we cannot agree with everybody.” While he expresses acceptance of difference of opinion, his language suggests that PAPAC does not go beyond acknowledgement of difference – it does not change its position or compromise with opponents. His comments on Peruvian Americans who opposed the USPTPA (discussed in the next chapter) reveal similar sentiments of acknowledgement but intransigence.

In the case of PANR, when asked about the website’s additional pro-business mission statement,35 Jara framed supporting business as an interest for all Peruvian Americans, saying “for us to develop economically, that must be everyone’s business” and “this is a stepladder

35 The homepage of www.panr.us says, “We have been serving the business community individually and we are aspiring to promote economic development at the national level.”
for every American”. And when asked whether any Peruvian Americans disagreed with the USPTPA, he replied “no.” Unlike Curitomai, Jara does not even acknowledge the differences of needs and opinion that surely exist within the Peruvian population in the U.S.

“To influence events in their home country”

Finally, close reading found a small amount of evidence that the organizations say they are concerned with supporting the interests of Peru. The opening paragraph of the newspaper article says that PAPO “has a dual purpose: to raise the profile of the Peruvian community in local U.S. politics, and to influence events in their home country.” However, Curitomai seems to attempt to downplay this aspect of the organization’s mission in favor of portraying the organization as supporting Peruvian Americans and their political incorporation first: “It’s good to think about Peru but more important to think about life here in the United States.” It appears that the leaders of PAPO may wish to portray their organization as focusing on Peruvian Americans and their political involvement and, to a lesser extant, Peru.

Curitomai’s description of the PAPAC’s mission, however, does not mention Peru, though his defense of some of the organization’s activities does indicate concern for Peru. This piece will also be discussed in the next chapter. Jara did not mention support for Peru in his description of PANR’s goals. But he did raise the issue when he informed me of a presidential debate that PANR is organizing in Florida for Peru’s next election, evidence of an interest in Peruvian politics and increasing Peruvian American participation there.

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36 This type of language may be common among immigrant organizations, so it will be interesting to analyze where it may come from, which I will do in the next two chapters. Then it might be possible to make some tentative generalizations about other organizations that portray business interest as the same as immigrant community interest.
To sum, analysis of the self-descriptions of PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR show that they describe themselves as concerned with advocating for Peruvians in the U.S. and increasing their political participation and, to a lesser extent, supporting Peru and businesses and the organizations’ profile.

Concealed group interests

The same content analysis of the organizations’ self-descriptions in newspaper articles, publications, websites, and interviews reveals that, in addition to concern for Peruvian Americans and Peru, the leaders may be motivated by political and economic self-interest and informed by free-market liberalism. From PANR’s homepage message, “We have been serving the business community individually and we are aspiring to promote economic development at the national level,” and announcements about the high positions that the group’s members hold in corporations, PANR expresses interest in advocating for and supporting business. PAPAC’s newsletter and Curitomai’s posts about PAPO on his website highlight the groups’ business elite connections in statements such as, “Among the prominent businessmen in attendance were…” and “Norberto Curitomai’s gala surpasses expectations…” Therefore, it is possible that its leaders want to use their organizations to advance their own business interests. It is also possible that the leaders of the three groups genuinely believe that supporting business is supporting Peruvian Americans, in which case they may be motivated by free-market liberalism, rather than or in addition to self-interest. In other words, as businessmen, the leaders of the three organizations may see the world through a particular pro-business lens or political orientation, and therefore may see pro-business activity as good for Peruvian Americans in general.
All three organizations expressed the desire to raise their organizations’ profile and boasted of the elite businessmen and politicians with whom they associate. PAPAC and PAPO’s websites, along with www.curito.com, feature political boasting as well. A PAPAC newsletter announces Curitomai’s attendance of a Latino Business and Community Leaders Reception. Curitomai’s website lists the politicians among the 400 people who met with PAPAC at Curitomai’s gala and highlights PAPO leadership as members of an “honorary committee” that had the opportunity to meet with President Uribe of Colombia. PANR’s website lists the “notables” who attended their legislative forum at the White House on Peruvian Independence Day. This indicates the possibility of an interest in elevating the personal status of the leaders of the groups. Additional close reading of the self-descriptions and analysis of the groups’ explanations of their platforms is necessary to verify these theories. A close reading of the self-description statements in the Herald News article and interviews with Norberto Curitomai and Daniel Jara provides some evidence for the 2nd hypothesis, that political and economic self-interest and free-market liberalism condition PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR’s goals and activities.

In the Herald News article about PAPO, Aristo Carranza calls his own organization “a new awakening in our community,” implying that Peruvian Americans have not been politically active until PAPO and that the founding of the organization may have transformative effects on the community. The claim does not sound like ambitious promises for the future, but rather like the leaders of the organization congratulating themselves preemptively for the “awakening” that having founded an organization signifies. As an example of efforts to influence events in Peru, the organization cites a bill they are advocating for that “would establish positions in Peru’s congress to represent those living
abroad.” It is possible that PAPO supports the bill because some of its leaders wish to run for office in Peru.

There was little explicit evidence of political self-interest in the interview about PAPAC, though Curitomai volunteered, “…Congressman Bill Pascrell’s support, he never worked for a FTA in all his career. But we approach him; we talked to him and including myself and making an appointment and want him to see the President of Peru himself, Alan Garcia. And they meet together in Washington, DC, and after those meetings, he was in favor of the FTA. …He has a very powerful position about it,” which could be taken as boasting about political connections, a possible indication of the possibility of political self-interest.

Jara also seemed to use the interview as an opportunity to showcase his political connections. When I asked what specific issues PANR is involved with, Jara replied, “Yeah we were pretty much involved in the free trade agreement between the U.S. and Peru. In fact, I was the only Peruvian American to testify before the Ways and Means Committee of Congress.” Such unsolicited boasting leads me to consider the possibility of political self-interest in Jara’s activities. Jara also said, “We looking for Peruvian Americans and Peruvians abroad to have seat in the Peruvian Congress, since Peruvian Americans continue to support about 4% of GDP in Peru with money transfers and investments,” which is the same position as PAPO and a possible indicator of a personal interest in running for office in Peru.

Close reading of my interview with Curitomai did not indicate that there is anything in PAPAC’s mission that explicitly demonstrates economic or political self-interest. However, Curitomai made his personal views clear with statements such as “I supported Keiko Fujimori because she is a great candidate… and she has the free market policy
supporting” and “I have business in Peru. I am importing equipment from the US to Peru. I have a business in Peru. And that’s one of the reasons that I supported [inaudible word].” Curitomai has a personal economic interest in his two organizations, PAPAC and PAPO, supporting pro-business policies, such as the USPTPA, between the U.S. and Peru.

Interestingly, another statement he made regarding the new Republican Governor Christie shows that Curitomai may attempt to separate his personal interests and even pro-business political orientation from his positions as head of PAPAC and PAPO: “…Governor Christie win, and we see, as a businessman I can see that is a positive way, it can be positive for our economic situation, but as a community member, I see all the effects it have in the education, poverty reduction, has effected our community, social services, immigration, that those affect our community…” It appears that, to some extent, Curitomai wants either to separate his interests and political beliefs from his position as the leader of a Peruvian American group or to give the appearance of separating them. This separation will be examined more in the next two chapters.

While in the article on PAPO there are no quotations citing a business interest, the fact that the group’s support of the USPTPA came up twice in the 480-word article may signify that they have a special interest in the Agreement, which will be discussed further in the next chapter. Additionally, their statement that while they are “non-partisan,” they hope to help “keep influential leftist forces such as Hugo Chavez, the president of Venezuela, at bay” suggests othering those who are to the “left” of their free-market liberalism. This possibility will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapters.

The interview with Jara more explicitly revealed the possibility of economic self-interest and/or free-market liberalism in PANR than in PAPAC and PAPO. As I mentioned
in a previous section, Jara seems to see PANR’s second goal of serving the business community as in the interest of every American. His organization’s website lists an additional mission statement that says,

We have been serving the business community individually and we are aspiring to promote economic development at the national level

When asked about this statement, Jara framed supporting business as an interest for all Peruvian Americans, saying, “For us to develop economically, that must be everyone’s business” and “This is a stepladder for every American.” While they do not necessarily point to economic interest, the mission statement and this generalization and simplification hint at the possibility of some sort of focus on business and projecting it onto the rest of Peruvian Americans.

The analysis above, coupled with the fact that Jara and Curitomai are known to have businesses in Peru that would benefit from the USPTPA, is evidence for the possibility that economic self-interest may influence some of the behaviors of PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR. The data suggests that it is possible that, in addition to expecting that their pro-business agendas are good for their own businesses, the leaders of the organizations may actually believe that their pro-business agendas are good for Peru and Peruvian Americans. It is possible that through their education, their experiences as business-owners, and the circles with which they associate, they have developed a free-market liberal ideology that they project onto the rest of Peruvian Americans and Peruvians. It is alternatively possible that the leaders’ suggestions that their policies are good for Peru and Peruvian Americans is merely a disingenuous justification for supporting policies that are only good for the leaders themselves. This distinction is difficult to make with certainty and will be examined further in the next chapters.
Conclusion

This chapter has two broad findings. First, that political transnationalism literature’s assumption that immigrant interest groups work to benefit the immigrant community and increase its political incorporation while also working to benefit the country of origin is demonstrated by the self-descriptions. The leaders of PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR express primary concern for the interests of Peruvian Americans and Peru and with increasing Peruvian American participation in U.S. politics. While the leaders did not emphasize concern for Peru, the factor was present. Concern for Peruvian Americans and their political participation were highlighted above other interests.

The second claim, that political and economic self-interest and free-market liberalism condition the formation of the groups’ agendas, also found some support from analysis of self-descriptions. While there was boasting about political and business connections, it might be a stretch to base confirmation of the hypothesis on mere boasting. Advocacy for business interests was more explicit, particularly in the case of PANR. But the evidence found in the self-descriptions does not help us distinguish between free-market liberalism and economic self-interest at this point. This first empirical chapter analyzes only what the leaders said about their own organizations, whether in interviews or on their websites or publications, so at this point, we can see what the leaders would like us to see. In the next chapter, we examine more closely their particular actions and positions, as well as their endorsed candidates, personal lives, and coalition members, in order to test their self-descriptions and, therefore, the political transnationalism assumptions.
Chapter 4 – Naked interests? Economic and political agendas of Peruvian immigrant lobbies

Holding lobbies to their missions: Do the groups do what they say they do? Or are they vehicles for their leaders’ self-interest?

Introduction

In this chapter, I hold the three mainstream Peruvian American political organizations to their missions by looking critically for evidence of other interests (political and economic self-interest) and free-market liberal ideology impacting their agendas. Here I examine their activities, positions, endorsements, coalition partners, characterization of dissidents, and the leaders as individuals. I do this because factors that influence the organizations’ decisions may be found in more than their words and actions.

The third chapter established that the political transnationalism literature is correct, at least on the surface, in its assumption that immigrant lobbies describe their groups as working for the immigrant community and the country of origin, as well as increasing political participation in the host country. However, as I demonstrated theoretically in the first chapter, the literature fails to adequately investigate the potential impact of leaders’ interests and free-market liberalism, associated with their particular demographic. While, on the surface, the leaders of PAPO, PAPAC, and PANR generally convey an image that fits into the political transnationalism assumptions, there were hints of evidence for the presence of other interests and factors involved in the agenda-setting. In this chapter, I test these other
factors, namely political and economic self-interest and free-market liberalism, by examining groups’ specific activities and positions, particularly on the USPTPA.

If I find that the actions of the three organizations meet their stated aims, then the political transnationalism literature’s assumptions will stand uncontested. However, if I find that the organizations have other interests that they are less explicit about and perhaps a particular ideology that distorts their genuine attempts to serve the interests they claim to, then not only are the organizations providing an inaccurate image of Peruvian and Peruvian American interests to U.S. politicians, but the political transnationalism literature may be found lacking in analysis of other factors at play.

In this chapter, I look for and expect to find evidence of the three new factors - I expect to find that leaders focus on activities that will enhance their own economic and political standing, such as galas, celebrations, and workshops and legislation that favor business. These activities would indicate either self-interest or free-market liberalism because only through such an ideology could they be argued as in the interest of Peruvians (“what’s good for business is good for everyone”). Meanwhile these activities would certainly serve the economic and political interests of the leaders. However, I also expect to find some activities that are aimed at serving the immigrant community and country of origin, such as legislation for immigration reform. And I expect to find that they endorse candidates who are in line with free-market liberalism and whose policies would be good for their businesses.

Using content analysis and close reading, as well as general investigation into the activities of the organizations, I find that, to varying degrees, PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR’s activities may reflect political and economic self-interest and free-market liberalism. I find that leaders of the three organizations have businesses and sometimes political ambitions that
would benefit from the various bilateral trade agreements that their organizations have actively supported. I find that their justifications for supporting the USPTPA reveal a free-market liberal ideology. I find that the leaders of the organizations express some negative characterizations of dissidents and that endorsed candidates often share those views. And I find that all three organizations have partnered numerous times with Chambers of Commerce.

Most of the data for this chapter is the same as in the previous chapter – newspaper articles, websites, and interviews. This chapter also looks at the websites of and my interviews with organizations with which PAPO, PAPAC, and PANR have worked. I identified these organizations by asking during my interviews with Jara and Curitomai and from the three groups’ websites. I found the businesses and political ambitions of the leaders through LexisNexis searches, conversations with alternative Peruvian American organization leaders, and the websites of the three mainstream groups. And I gathered data on the endorsed candidates by visiting their websites, reading their press releases and congressional votes, and interviewing one of their aids.

_Last chance for the alternative hypotheses_

Taken alone, each strand examined in the literature review does not hold up when tested on certain concrete cases, including the case of the Peruvian American political organizations. Alone, the largely discounted 5th column strand fails to explain cases in which immigrants and immigrant interest groups sometimes disagree with the government of their country of origin and advocate that the U.S. oppose it. Cuban American advocacy of the continuation of the U.S. embargo on Cuba is an example (Haney and Vanderbush 1999).
Furthermore, there are numerous immigrant interest groups, such as the Latino Political Action Committee of Washington, which focus on the needs of the immigrant community. When applied to the Peruvian American organizations, the 5th column literature fails to explain the organizations’ support for education and healthcare reform.

Additionally, I learned through my interviews that the leaders of PAPO, PAPAC, and PANR, not to mention the various Hispanic Chambers of Commerce and the alternative Peruvian American organizations, have never been in contact with Alan García and have never received a request from anyone in the Peruvian government. Rather, it was their own initiative to support the USPTPA and other transnational policies. The literature also does not explain why the organizations would choose to support the USPTPA as it is written, and not press for negotiation of the terms in favor of Peru. Thus, the 5th column strand alone is unable to explain all aspects of the behavior of immigrant interest groups.

The political transnationalism strand improves on 5th column by allowing for the possibility that immigrant interest groups are concerned with either the immigrant community and the country of origin or both and also by showing how those concerns actually help the immigrant community become politically incorporated. However, the political transnationalism strand alone also fails the empirical test in some cases as it does not adequately address the impact of the leaders’ demographic on the organizations’ activities and discourse. There are instances in which such organizations appear to be concerned with other interests as well. For example, Paul observed that the Armenian American lobby developed its campaign against the US-Azerbaijan alliance independent of the community and only sought their support after the campaign was launched (Paul 2000).


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Sometimes the community has to be persuaded to support a policy that “its” lobby derived without consultation. In the Peruvian American case, the literature does not adequately explain why two groups of organizations – the mainstream and the alternative - that claim to serve the same Peruvian American community would do so in conflicting ways. It also does not explain PANR’s lack of interest in advocating for social services and reforms that affect Peruvian Americans, despite the organization’s mission statement and the fact that PAPO and PAPAC, which have similar mission statements, do advocate for such policies.

Because each of the 5th column and political incorporation hypotheses alone do not adequately explain the motivations of the mainstream Peruvian American political organizations, it is necessary to attempt to combine them and apply the political and economic self-interest and ideology theories to the organizations, as I will do in the rest of this chapter and the chapter that follows.

Introduction to PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR’s “naked interests”

A brief introduction to the activities of the mainstream Peruvian American political organizations already shows that while their missions and names are very similar, their activities are distinct. Since PANR was founded in 2006, it has been almost entirely devoted to promoting business interests – through support of the USPTPA and other bilateral trade agreements, forums and workshops for small businesses, the creation of a business incubator in Lima, and the endorsement of conservative candidates in Florida.

By contrast, the actions of PAPAC and PAPO are more reflective of their stated aims and names, though with some notable discrepancy. PAPAC appears to have been most active in holding workshops and forums to increase Peruvian American political participation and
in advocating for immigration reform, particularly for sanctuary cities and for Temporary Protection Status for Peruvians living in the U.S. PAPO also seems to have focused on advocating for Temporary Protection Status. But the organizations’ secondary focuses have been promoting the USPTPA (and other bilateral trade agreements) and throwing publicity events, such as “Curitomai’s” gala, which could be seen as strategic political networking. Thus, while an element of political boasting and pro-business activity exists, PAPAC and PAPO’s actions are much more in line with their mission and the political transnationalism assumptions than PANR. But this chapter will only look at evidence for the former, while the next chapter will look at evidence for the political transnationalism assumptions.

*The controversy surrounding the USPTPA*

The mainstream Peruvian American political organizations’ support for the USPTPA and for businesses may not fit with the statistical data on Peruvian Americans or on Peruvians. The Agreement reduces Peruvian tariffs on U.S. imports and requires Peru to accept U.S. intellectual property rights, equal foreign direct investment rights, and other measures to counter-balance the similar benefits that had already been granted to Peru through the Andean Trade Preference Act in 1991. While the leaders of the three organizations framed the Agreement as benefiting Peruvians in both the U.S. and Peru, it may have little direct positive impact on either group. The only U.S. demographic impacted by the Agreement are likely to be agribusinesses, export manufacturers, shipping companies, and multinational corporations. As noted from the American Community Survey data, the vast majority of employed Peruvians in the U.S. work in service industries, which would not

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likely be affected by the Agreement. And while some Peruvians living in the U.S. may own companies in Peru that would gain from the Agreement, most Peruvians living in the U.S. do not own businesses in the U.S. or Peru.

While we cannot know how many Peruvians in the U.S. agree with them, the alternative organizations, Instituto de Capacitación y Integral (INDECAPI) and the TIKSI Group, as well as a number of blogs, such as peruanista.blogspot.com and editordelnorte.com, within the Peruvian population in the U.S. are very outspoken in their opposition to the USPTPA and its impact on Peru’s poor, indigenous, farmers, and environment.\[39\] These voices, however, are acknowledged by discounted by leaders of PAPO and PAPAC and altogether excluded by leaders of PANR.\[40\]

The Peruvian end is more complicated to evaluate, as there are obvious costs and benefits for the country as a whole. However, while the Peruvian president supported the Agreement, there was not consensus among the Peruvian people.\[41\] It also was not widely accepted that the Agreement would help pull Peruvians out of poverty, a large challenge for Peru as 35% of Peruvians live below the poverty line.\[42\] Many opponents of the Agreement feared that the reduction of Peruvian tariffs against subsidized U.S. crops could hurt the livelihoods of Peruvian small farmers, who make up 30% of the workforce. There was also concern that the Agreement would allow American and transnational corporations to take advantage of the Amazon’s natural resources, which might destroy the environment and

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40 Curitomai 2011; Jara 2011.
displace the indigenous peoples inhabiting it. And finally, there were concerns that the Agreement would hurt some Peruvian industries that were not developed enough to compete with U.S. industries. Indigenous and farmer groups in Peru lobbied and demonstrated against the Agreement.\textsuperscript{43} Ollanta Humala, the runner-up in the 2006 presidential election, incorporated opposition to the Agreement into his platform.\textsuperscript{44}

The USPTPA passed in both the Peruvian and American congresses. But the question remains: why did PANR, PAPO, and PAPAC, the mainstream Peruvian American political organizations, rally behind the Agreement? The organizations claim to advocate for both the Peruvian American community and Peru, but the USPTPA may not be beneficial to either group. If the organizations may not really represent the interests of those two groups, then whose interests do they represent? Other Peruvian Americans protested the USPTPA and later formed organizations that represented a voice that contradicted that of the mainstream Peruvian American organizations.\textsuperscript{45} Where were the alternative voices in the mainstream organizations’ campaign? Why were they not included by organizations that aim to, as PANR declares, “bring together the different voices of all people of Peruvian origin in the United States”?\textsuperscript{46}

As considered above, the mainstream Peruvian American lobby strongly supported the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, in 2006 and 2007. Since then, it has endorsed candidates in part because of their past support of the Agreement. Currently, they are

\textsuperscript{46} www.panr.us.
strongly in support of the free trade agreement between the U.S. and Colombia. Yet neither the Peruvian American community, which the Peruvian American lobby claims to represent, nor Peruvians in Peru were unanimously in support of the Agreement or would necessarily economically benefit from it. Furthermore, other Peruvian American organizations, which similarly claim to act in the interest of Peruvian Americans and Peru, hold the opposite opinion of the USPTPA. Why then, was the USPTPA central to the mainstream lobby’s platform in the years before it was passed? If the lobby did not reflect the interests of all Peruvian Americans or Peruvians, then whose interests did it reflect? And why did the alternative Peruvian American organizations oppose the USPTPA and whose interests did their agenda reflect?

The issues in the Peruvian American organizations’ agendas somewhat reflect the statistics. As 40% of Peruvians living in the U.S. are not citizens and even more may be undocumented, it is not surprising all three organizations are concerned with immigration reform and Temporary Protection Status for Peruvians after the 2007 earthquake in Peru. PAPAC and PAPO also advocate for social services such as health care and education, which, if at least half of Peruvians live on less than $24,000 per year, might be of interest to much of the community. While these agenda points make sense, they are not the only focuses of the three mainstream organizations. PAPAC and PAPO have also devoted much of their efforts toward supporting the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (USPTPA) and other pro-business measures. PANR has focused almost entirely (with the exception of a relief program for the victims of the earthquake) on supporting the USPTPA and Peruvian American and Peruvian businesses. Social services and immigration are not mentioned in any of the organization’s publications, and its endorsed candidates have all been Republicans

who were mixed on immigration reform, opposed expanding social services, and supported the USPTPA.

The mainstream lobby and the USPTPA

The reasoning that PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR provide for their support of the USPTPA may be indicative of the interests and free-market liberalism of the leaders. Content analysis of the organizations’ justifications for support of the Agreement shows that, depending on the audience, the leaders make a number of different arguments for their position, including the benefits the USPTPA would have for Peruvian Americans, Peru, U.S. workers, Latinos, business in the U.S. and/or Peru, and U.S.-Peru relations (see Appendix C for content analysis results). There are several rhetorical devices, including hyperbole, generalization, presupposition, insinuation, inconsistency, and framing, that the leaders use to stretch the supposed benefits of the Agreement to fit each population. These rhetorical devices are of interest because, in some cases, they may demonstrate the weakness of the groups’ arguments (due perhaps to the possibility that the leaders themselves do not believe their arguments or that the arguments are grounded more in ideology than reason) or may hint at the presence of less explicit motives.

The leaders of the three groups sometimes generalize about the size of the population that would benefit from or that wanted the USPTPA. While it is possible that most Peruvians and most Peruvian Americans supported the Agreement, it is known (even to Curitomai, himself) that some in each population opposed it (Curitomai’s characterizations of such dissidents is analyzed below). Yet in public statements to U.S. and Peruvian politicians, PAPO and PAPAC made it sound as though all Peruvian Americans wanted the Agreement. In a letter to President García, PAPO wrote, “In the name of all the Peruvians that live in this
country, I express our congratulations for the success achieved with the passage of the FTA”.

In a similar letter to President Bush in 2008, PAPO wrote

...successfully promoted passage of the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement late last year, and you have also been an advocate of comprehensive immigration reform...the one million Peruvians living in the United States and their relatives in Peru are grateful for everything your Administration has done for Peru during your eight years as President.49

Representing PANR, Daniel Jara made a similar claim, affirming, “The issue of the ratification (FTA) by the U.S. Congress is an enormous concern of the Peruvian citizens in the American Union”.50 It seems that, in an effort to strengthen their argument for the USPTPA, they extended its support base to all Peruvian Americans (“and their relatives in Peru”).51 This technique, however, is inconsistent with the missions of the three organizations, which are, in part, to represent the voices of Peruvians in the U.S.

It is significant that one of PAPAC and PAPO’s main arguments for the USPTPA is the growth it will stimulate in Peru, PANR emphasizes instead that it would contribute to economic growth in the U.S. In a 2007 Herald News article, Curitomai says on behalf of PAPAC, “It will benefit a lot of businesses and people in Peru. It would definitely improve the economic situation in Peru”.

And in a letter to Garcia in 2008, PAPO writes that the


51 In 2007, before the Agreement was passed, Curitomai told a Herald News reporter that, “the community would be excited by House passage of the agreement.” Source: see citation below.

Agreement is “vital to Peru and Peruvians in general”. These reasons emphasize the positive impact of the Agreement on Peru’s economic development.

PAPAC and PAPO’s emphasis was on the benefits to the Peruvian economy. Their only mention of economic benefit for the U.S. is, “It will open a market for the United States (in Peru)”, and mention of gains for Peruvian Americans, specifically. During my interview with Curitomai, he said he supported the Agreement because of the economic growth through U.S. investment that it would sustain in Peru and the wider choices of products it would enable Peruvians to buy. He gave his business as an example of companies the Agreement would enable to provide more goods to Peruvians,

I’m taking many products from US to Peru myself. I’m importing heavy equipment to Peru, machineries and [inaudible] equipments to Peru and there is a big improvement in commercial trade with Peru and that’s why I supported the FTA.

It is, however, possible that he is really more interested in the benefit the USPTPA will bring to his business than the benefit it will bring to Peruvians through his business. When asked about the industries that might be hurt by the competition brought by the US PTPA, he admitted that “there will be side effects of some industries that will be affected” and cited the textile industry as an area of concern, but he said that “the government of the U.S. and Peru they still working with that concerns” and that the huge amount of growth is good for

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54 In another article, he says, “We believe that this will improve the Peruvian economy…There will be more businesses opening in Peru.” And Aristo Carranza, co-chair of PAPO, says the USPTPA is a “good chance for Peru to develop”. Source: Denisa R. Superville, "Pascrell Backs Peru Trade Pact; Democrat Cites Worker Rights Provisions," Herald News [Passaic County, NJ] 30 Oct. 2007a. LexisNexis Academic, Web. 12 Mar. 2011 <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.
55 Superville 2007a.
everyone. He only mentions the benefit of the USPTPA for the U.S. briefly at the end of the statement, “It’s not just useful for Peru but also for the U.S.”.\(^{56}\)

Meanwhile, PANR mentions economic growth in Peru only once, “PTPA will promote economic growth in Peru, stabilizing its economy and providing its citizens with long-term alternatives to narcotics trafficking or illegal immigration”.\(^{57}\) PANR’s economic emphasis was really on the benefits for the U.S. and U.S. businesses. When I asked why PANR supported the USPTPA, Jara replied, “FTAs level the playing field for small businesses to do international trade” and later said, “Level the playing field for American businesses that want to do business in Peru. Because at that time, Peruvians could export to the US, tariff free. It was not the same for a US company who wanted to trade with Peru”.\(^{58}\)

In a *Herald News* article in 2007, he said, “The trade agreement will create jobs in New Jersey, especially among Latino businesses that already have experience working with Peruvian companies”.\(^{59}\) In a letter to Congress, “investment with Peru already sustains thousands of US jobs… agreement will bring reciprocity to US Peru trade”.\(^{60}\) In an *Ayllu Times* article, PANR said that the USPTPA would “protect all Americans against disloyal trade”.\(^{61}\) In terms of economics, PANR emphasizes the benefit for the U.S., while PAPAC and PAPO emphasize the benefit for Peru.

\(^{56}\) Norberto Curitomai, “PAPAC and PAPO,” Telephone interview, 10 Jan. 2011.


\(^{58}\) Jara 2011.


\(^{60}\) Daniel Jara et al. 2007.

\(^{61}\) The original text, in Spanish, thanks Congress for approving the US-PTPA and “por la decisión de proteger a todos los estadounidenses contra el comercio desleal.” Source: “Califica Como 'Justo' el TLC Entre Perú Y EEUU,” *Ayllu Times* [East Elmhurst, NY] 9-15 Nov. 2007a.
Again, there are multiple possible explanations for this difference. If we take their arguments at face value, then the divergent emphases may mean that PAPAC and PAPO are more concerned with Peru and PANR is more concerned with the U.S. Another possibility is that PANR is appealing to a different audience than PAPAC and PAPO. However, their distinct arguments were found in the same venues: newspaper articles, interviews, and letters to politicians. Economic self-interest is another possible explanation for the difference. Curitomai’s business is based in Lima, while Jara and the other leaders of PANR have or work for U.S.-based businesses. Perhaps they each see the USPTPA in terms of what it will do for their business – Curitomai may see that it could help his Peruvian export/import business, while Jara and the others may see that it could help their U.S.-based businesses.

USPTPA = Democracy?

Another argument that PANR, PAPO, and PAPAC make is that approval of the USPTPA would promote democracy in an increasingly unstable region. This argument is important to analyze because it does two things. It demonstrates free-market liberalism and possibly economic or political self-interest. And it feeds into the groups’ “othering” of Peruvian Americans and Peruvians who disagree with their positions. This exclusion contradicts the organizations’ mission statements and the political transnationalism assumption that they seek to represent their community.

In an Ayllu Times article, Jara says on behalf of PANR that the USPTPA “is a demonstration of compromise by the U.S. in the support and strengthening of new
democracies in the hemisphere”\(^{62}\). In a letter to several U.S. Congress people in July 2007, PANR makes a similar argument, emphasizing that the USPTPA would be a “helping hand for our friends, allies, and neighbors. The agreement will enhance U.S. efforts to strengthen democracy in the Andean region and lend support for the rule of law…”\(^{63}\) As it is not immediately apparent that democracies in Latin America are in jeopardy, especially not Peru, it is possible that by “democracy,” PANR really means “friend to the U.S.,” a category mentioned in the last quotation right before “democracy.” This might explain why supporting a bilateral trade agreement, which Humala, Peru’s left-leaning runner-up for president opposed, might be described as “promoting democracy.” Similarly, Curitomai was paraphrased in the *Herald News* saying that PAPO supports “free trade, which it views as a way to strengthen U.S.-Peruvian ties and to keep influential leftist forces such as Hugo Chavez, the president of Venezuela, at bay”\(^{64}\).

This language is also connected to that of several of the politicians that PANR endorsed. In my interview, Representative David Rivera’s deputy chief said that PANR “decided to endorse him based on his stance on free trade in the region and on democracy in the region and opposing leftist dictators like Hugo Chavez”\(^{65}\). Representative Diaz-Balart’s website says, “I look forward to working with Peruvian leaders to ensure democracy and rule of law in an increasingly unstable region and to strengthen bilateral relations through free

\(^{62}\) The original text, in Spanish, says, “La aprobación de este proyecto de ley, ha demostrado el compromiso de los Estados Unidos de apoyar y fortalecer las nuevas democracias en el hemisferio.” Source: “Califica Como ‘Justo.’”

\(^{63}\) Daniel Jara et al. 2007.


\(^{65}\) “Representative David Rivera's Deputy Chief,” Telephone interview, 15 Jan. 2011.
This language does not seem to be unusual in Congress. While he does not mention democracy, Representative Charles Rangel (not endorsed by PANR, PAPO, or PAPAC) does allude to the “friend of the U.S.” argument for the USPTPA here, “This agreement will strengthen an important ally of ours in that region. Peru is resisting the efforts of Venezuela's authoritarian President Hugo Chavez to wage a war of words and ideas in Latin America against the U.S.” Thus the exaggerated language used by leaders of the three organizations is very much part of mainstream U.S. politics.

Returning to the organizations, in a 2006 newspaper article describing the “nightmare” for Latinos of watching “homelands drift leftward” and becoming “increasingly anti-American,” Jara says, “Obviously those of us who live abroad and have a clearer vision are concerned about the possibility that our countries could turn to the left, and even worse, become the enemies of the United States. He accuses the United States of imperialism, but I believe he is creating a Bolivarian imperialism”. This characterization of Humala suggests that Jara sees him and his supporters (note that Humala lost to García by about 1 percentage point and branches of his political party are active in New Jersey) as threats to the U.S. and Peruvian Americans, despite the fact that they are part of the constituency that PANR’s mission is supposedly interested in.

In my interview, Curitomai said of Peruvians in the U.S. who opposed the USPTPA, “Those people are from the Left, I can say that, or people that they believe that socialism or


68 Perez 2006.
communism is a good way to the life of the Peruvian community. They’re never going to agree with the FTA, never going to agree with investment, they have another way to see that things.” When asked about the conflict in Bagua, he launched into criticism of the protestors:

That [protest] was done by politicians or people that have great interest in bringing that kind of situation to the FTA... those people that was leading that rising in Bagua was being financed and supported by Mr. Chavez from Venezuela and Mr. Evo Morales from Bolivia. Those people have been financed...to rise up. Both of them, from Bolivia and Venezuela, they don’t want to see any improvement or any FTA for any country...And unfortunately, there was a huge amount of life that has been lost in that issue in Bagua. But those people in their and other places in Peru, in the Andes, whatever, they believe when somebody goes there and they believe what they hear. They say, your land’s gonna be grabbed for the government, or the river is gonna be poisoned, or all those lands are gonna be taken by companies from the US and bla bla bla bla. And they react – they hear that, they believe that. Even there was a congresswoman from Peru itself, I don’t remember the name, but a lady. They was having meetings with those people and they telling that the government’s gonna grab the lands and they gonna give it to the lands to investors and they gonna poison the river and all that kind of stuff.

While Curitomai laments the deaths in the Bagua protests against the decrees passed in compliance with the USPTPA, he says that the protestors and their views were manipulated by foreign leaders, who “don’t want to see any improvement...for any country”. His characterization implies distaste for those opponents of the USPTPA, including a Peruvian congresswoman. By condemning those views, Curitomai effectively excludes them from the constituents of his organizations.

This network of quotations points to the possibility of politicians and interest groups’ conflation of “democracy” with “ally” and “right,” standing opposite the conflation of “undemocratic” with “anti-American” and “leftist.” Indeed, the Record identifies President Uribe of Colombia, who has his share of conflicts with democracy, as the only Latin American leader who falls into the first category (“democracy,” “ally,” “right): “Only Colombia's
President Alvaro Uribe, who is expected to be reelected today, is out of step with the leftist wave.\textsuperscript{70}

Examining this polarizing and generalizing way in which the organizations characterize their political and ideological opponents helps to shed light on the personal political and ideological leanings of the groups’ leaders (as well as the leaders of the U.S., but we will not get into that). The leaders of PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR tend to describe those who oppose the USPTPA, those who support the victims of or participated in the Bagua conflict, and those who sympathize with Chavez and/or Humala, as people who do not want to see Peru grow and are imperialist, manipulated, malicious, anti-democracy, and Lefties.

Reflecting statements of some Congressmen, PAPAC and PAPO, and, especially, PANR’s argument that the USPTPA would help the U.S. strengthen democracies seems to employ several rhetorical devices: conflation, insinuation, and framing. The conflation is outlined above. The insinuation is that Chavez is undemocratic and that, if elected, Humala would have been as well, and would also have turned Peru into an enemy of the U.S. And the organizations and politicians frame the USPTPA in terms of this Cold War style dichotomy, rather than in terms of economics and trade, as it is also commonly framed.

There are several possible reasons for the organizations’ use of these devices that mirror politicians’ arguments. The leaders of the groups may be interested in the USPTPA for economic reasons (both self-interested and/or for Peru’s growth) but appeals to politicians’ political dichotomy argument in order to garner their support. Alternatively, they may fear that if its country of origin, Peru, does not maintain its place as ally to the U.S., it may indeed become an “enemy,” putting Peruvian Americans in, as the Record puts it, “a

\textsuperscript{70} Perez 2006.
precarious position.” It is also possible that the leaders possess an ideological leaning that is similar to one that some of these Congressmen may have. Perhaps they leaders possess a belief in the market that is so strong that the failure of a trade agreement or the rise of a “leftist” politician who might try to control the market is to them undemocratic and threatening.

This “othering” is also significant because scholars, such as Kill (2006), find that the defining of those that are excluded helps to define those whom the leaders really see as part of their constituency. So when we see those who oppose the USPTPA and other positions of the groups described as Leftists and imperialists, it shows that the organizations do not see their community as containing or concerned with its political dissidents, contrary to the mission statements of the groups. Characterizations of “others” might also indicate political or economic self-interest – the interests of the “other” are not in the interests of the group leaders. For example, a Chavez-style government in Peru might not be in their interest because their businesses there might be taxed more. And in terms of their political interests, perhaps they feel that it is beneficial for them to follow the U.S. line, which sees Chavez as a threat because he is critical of the U.S. And so they try to distance themselves from him. This is an interesting issue because it also points positively to political incorporation. The leaders of PAPO, PANR, and PAPAC might be trying to protect the image of all Peruvian Americans from governments and individuals critical of the U.S., and thus increase their acceptance and incorporation into the U.S. and American politics.

Such “othering” also, importantly, shows that the leaders of the organizations are not doing what they say they do – rather than advance the interests of the whole or majority of the community, they exclude some voices. “Othering” contradicts the missions of the
organizations. While PANR’s leadership says in press releases, interviews, and their website that their mission is to “bring together the different voices of all people of Peruvian origin in the United States” and PAPAC and PAPO also claim to speak on behalf of and serve the “one million” Peruvians living in the U.S., the language they use to describe Peruvian Americans and Peruvians who disagree with them is not so inclusive, as shown by Jara and Curitomai’s descriptions of some left-leaning Peruvian citizens and political figures.

PAPAC and PAPO’s exclusionary “othering” is, however, a bit more complicated than that of PANR. While Curitomai and others in PAPAC and PAPO characterize their dissidents in a similar exclusionary manner, they also acknowledge that those people (at least the Peruvian American dissidents) are part of their community and that they have a right to their views and that that should be accepted. In the interview, Curitomai said, “We have a couple of people in the US, like in all communities, and they disagree with us … And people have to respect their theory”.\textsuperscript{71} PANR, on the other hand, does not attempt to acknowledge that its dissidents are part of its community. However, PAPAC and PAPO still do not negotiate or compromise with those views or include them in their decision-making with regard to their agendas.

\textit{PANR’s other activities: business and politics}

Besides advocating for the USPTPA and endorsing candidates, the three organizations have engaged in several types of activities. PANR’s other activities could be placed into three categories. The primary activities have been explicitly in favor of businesses. While this is in line with the secondary mission statement on their website, it goes somewhat against their primary mission statement, which is what they present in

\textsuperscript{71} Curitomai 2011.
articles, letters to politicians, and which Jara read to me during the interview. In addition to advocating for the USPTPA, they advocate for the U.S. bilateral trade agreement with Colombia, hold forums and workshops for businesses, and created a “business incubator” in Lima for transnational businesses.

The third area of activity is throwing self-promotional events in Washington, DC, which could be seen as rational political resource building. In fact, Jara mentioned his events in Washington numerously throughout the interview. Another issue they have taken on is working to get a seat in the Peruvian congress just for Peruvians living abroad. A lesser priority but still important activity of PANR has been earthquake relief. They started a fund for the victims of the earthquake in 2007. While this could be genuinely motivated by concern for the victims, it could also be falsified as image strategy, as it does not demand a change in the status quo and therefore is not politically risky for the organization. Finally, Jara says that his group is “always with immigration reform” and also lobbies on behalf of Peruvians running for office in the U.S., however I found no mention of such activity online, so they may not be a priorities for the group.

PANR collaborated with the Statewide Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (also headed by Daniel Jara), New Jersey Institute of Technology, and Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega to create a business incubator, called the Peruvian-American Center for Entrepreneurial Development (PACED), in Lima. The purpose of PACED is to help Peruvian and American companies engaging in transnational business (they call it “bi-national” business). A press release says that it “will serve as a bridge to U.S. companies interested in starting and developing businesses and investments with Peruvian and American companies” and will also “provide technical management training to Peruvian Small and Micro sized businesses

72 Jara 2011.
and to provide assistance to enable them to introduce their products and services in the large U.S. market.\textsuperscript{73}

PANR also holds forums and workshops for businesses. Their website advertises a 2010 International Forum of Investment and Trade, which featured Peruvian and U.S. politicians, representatives from the U.S. Small Business Administration, and the president of ADEX ("a leader in the Supply, Distribution, Service Support and Financing of US made Equipment, Machinery, Raw Materials, Accessories and Parts to the Mexican and Latin American Markets"\textsuperscript{74}). The workshops consisted of advice for businesses, particularly those that wish to take advantage of the recently implemented USPTPA. Also displayed on PANR’s website is a report on the group’s attendance at the Executive Education Program at the University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business. The purpose was to help Hispanic executives “maximize their effectiveness on behalf of Hispanic-owned businesses” and to “facilitate collaboration among local Hispanic Chambers of Commerce”\textsuperscript{75}

Finally, PANR cosigned several letters to Congress in support of the bilateral trade agreement that the U.S. is negotiating with Colombia.\textsuperscript{76} The letters made similar arguments to those PANR made for the USPTPA – that the agreement would be good for the U.S. economy, good for Colombia’s economy, good for U.S.-Colombia relations, and “will bolster the efforts of President Uribe and the Colombian people as they continue to collaborate with the United States in the fight against those forces seeking to destabilize

\textsuperscript{73} Daniel Jara, Statewide Hispanic Chamber of Commerce of New Jersey, \textit{First Business Incubator in Lima Is Unveiled}, Lima, 6 Dec. 2010.
the region through drugs and terror”. The categorization of support of the agreement with Colombia as pro-business is because, even more than the USPTPA, businesses are the only group within Peruvians or Peruvian Americans that would be impacted by such an agreement between the U.S. and Colombia.

In addition and related to supporting businesses, PANR has held a number of events in Washington, DC. These events seemed to aim to help businesses, advocate for the USPTPA, and enhance the image of PANR. Such events were always held in July, in honor of Peru’s Independence Day. Events took place in 2003, 2004, 2007, and 2008. In 2007, PANR sponsored a delegation of 100 Peruvian Americans, mostly businessmen, to visit Washington, where they celebrated Peruvian independence and asked legislators for the USPTPA. Their day of advocacy was followed by a reception, at which they explained to the legislators in attendance “PANR is a private non-partisan, non-profit corporation seeking to bring together the different voices of all people of Peruvian origin in the US” and then proceeded to request their support for the USPTPA. In a PANR press release that appeared in the Hispanic-American Chamber of Commerce’s August 2007 issue, Jara said, “The reception of the Peruvian delegation in the White House and Capitol marks an unprecedented and historic moment for the Peruvian American community in the US; which is estimated to be more than 1 million”.

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78 Events may have taken place in other years but I could not find any mention online. Sources: www.panr.us; Jara 2011.
In 2008, PANR returned to Washington for the "2nd Annual PANR Legislative Forum on Peruvian Independence Day at the White House." As the USPTPA had already passed in Congress, this event consisted of presentations by journalists and economists. They also gave a presentation for Independence Day at the White House, followed by a legislative reception, at which they honored a number of Congresspeople, including all four of the group’s endorsees and Pascrell, a Democrat from New Jersey endorsed by PAPAC. It appears that some of these events may have been aimed at both supporting business and enhancing PANR’s image, as suggested by Jara’s boasting about the “unprecedented and historic moment” that was his group’s delegation. But supporting businesses appears to be the activity to which PANR devotes the most time and resources, though it is not the mission statement that the organization provides when it is cited in newspaper articles.

A lesser area of activity for PANR was support for the creation of a seat in the Peruvian congress for Peruvians living abroad, until late 2007 when García created an electoral district for them. In a 2007 Herald News article, Jara describes the lack of a seat as unjust: “For every one Peruvian living outside the country, they are contributing what three living in Peru do” and tells “how he tried running for a congressional seat in the most recent Peruvian elections.” He says that he ran for office, he “had to compete with 300 candidates in a district of 7 million voters — it's a process totally out of reach if you reside outside of Peru”. It is possible that Jara supported the creation of a new seat because he wanted to run for office again. Or he may feel that Peruvians in the U.S. are underrepresented considering

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how numerous they are and how much they contribute to Peru’s economy. And he may have run for office for the same reason. It is also possible that he wanted to run for office to support business, considering that he told The Record in 2006 that some of his acts as congressman would be “to connect small businesses in Peru with Hispanic-run businesses in the United States and push for expanded free trade between the two countries” and to “help connect U.S. businesses to the Peruvian market”. Therefore, advocacy for a seat in the Peruvian congress may be a result of political self-interest impacting PANR’s agenda. However, as some alternative reasons provided are also viable, it is impossible to be certain.

PAPAC has also been somewhat involved in supporting the Peruvian bill that creates a seat in its congress for Peruvians abroad. I did not find any news suggesting that Curitomai or others from his groups intend to run for office in Peru. So support for the bill may come from concern for Peruvians and a desire to influence decisions pertaining to them, both from the U.S. government and the Peruvian government.

PAPAC and PAPO’s other activities: Business and galas

PAPAC and PAPO’s activities have been more varied and with a different focus. While there is certainly a component of pro-business activity beyond their extensive support of the USPTPA (they held galas for Hispanic businessmen and met with Uribe to show their support for Colombia’s free trade agreement with the U.S.), such activity is perhaps a secondary or tertiary activity of PAPAC and PAPO. However, this chapter will focus on the pro-business activities and galas, as they may be evidence for self-interest or free-market

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liberalism. The next chapter will discuss the other, perhaps primary, activities of PAPAC and PAPO.

PAPO was even more active than PANR in supporting the bilateral trade agreement between the U.S. and Colombia. Curitomai’s website says, “PAPO-USA, the organization that brings together the Peruvian American leaders in the U.S., expressed its full support of the project of the FTA between the U.S. and Colombia, an essential instrument for the economic and social development between the two nations.” The story shows that not only did PAPO express support, but also joined a group of of Peruvian, Dominican, Mexican, and Colombian businessmen and a U.S. congressman to meet with Colombian President Uribe at his Palacio de Gobierno in Bogotá. Curitomai’s website goes on to say

In said meeting, Mr. Curitomai, Peruvian leader, expressed to the Colombian mandate his support and collaboration to press the U.S. Congress so that they approve the FTA as soon as the internal elections are finalized. At the same reunion, Mr. Curitomai suggested to take as reference, the experience of the negotiations that were made before obtaining the Free Trade Agreement with Peru. President Alvaro Uribe thanked the congressman and Latin American entrepreneurs for their gesture of solidarity in their selfless support for the Colombian economy and thus Latin America.86

This story suggests that Colombia’s trade agreement was very important to Curitomai. As in the case of PANR, it seems as though the only Peruvians and Peruvian Americans that may be affected by PAPO’s position are businessmen. Thus, perhaps this activity is a form of economic self-interest. It is also possible that PAPO is interested in supporting Uribe for

86 Translated from Spanish, “PAPO-USA, la organización que agrupa a los líderes Peruano-Americanos en los Estados Unidos, expresó todo su respaldo al proyecto del tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos y Colombia, instrumento esencial para el desarrollo económico y social entre ambas naciones… En dicha reunión, el Sr. Curitomai, dirigente peruano, expresó al mandatario colombiano su apoyo y colaboración para presionar al Congreso Norteamericano, para que apruebe el Tratado de Libre Comercio, tan pronto finalicen las elecciones internas. En la misma reunión, el Sr. Curitomai sugirió tomar como referente, la experiencia de las negociaciones que se hicieron antes de obtener el Tratado de Libre Comercio con el Perú. El presidente Alvaro Uribe, agradeció este gesto de solidaridad al congresista y empresarios latinoamericanos por su desinteresado apoyo a la economía colombiana y por ende, Latinoamericana.” Source: Norberto Curitomai, Web. 12 Mar. 2011 <http://www.curito.com/>.
reasons suggested earlier in this chapter or perhaps in serving as a “middleman” between the U.S. and Colombia, thus elevating their political status.

Even more so than PANR, PAPAC and PAPO seem to throw numerous celebratory events. *Herald News* reports on PAPAC’s 2nd Anniversary gala at the Brownstone.\(^87\) The PAPAC’s website advertises, “The Peruvian American Political Action Committee cordially invites you to our 4th Annual Latino Business and Community Leaders Reception,” honoring several endorsed candidates and sponsored by a number of local companies.\(^88\) In a piece titled, “Norberto Curitomai’s gala surpasses expectations in Paterson,” Curitomai’s website later reports on the event, “Nearly four hundred people packed the Brownstone House in Paterson on the occasion of the Fourth Annual Gala of Norberto Curitomai, prominent businessman and member of the Board of Directors of the Peruvian American Political Action Committee PAPAC. It brought together politicians and business people and Hispanic Americans.” Although the event seems to have been thrown by PAPAC, the description on Curitomai’s website makes it sound as though he were the star of the event. Perhaps Curitomai hoped to raise his own profile through the event. The next year, PAPAC held a “$100-a-plate gala dinner…for its fifth anniversary,” according to a 2008 *Herald News* article. That same year, PAPO held its “First National Annual Meeting and First Anniversary” in Washington, DC.\(^89\) While it is likely that PAPAC and PAPO threw the events to raise money and support their endorsed candidates, it is also possible that they hoped to raise their organizations’ or their own profiles to serve political self-interest.

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\(^{88}\) www.peruvianamericans.com.

\(^{89}\) www.curito.com.
**Favorite candidates**

While all three organizations chose only to endorse candidates who supported the USPTPA, the rest of their endorsements differ among organizations. PANR’s candidates were also endorsed for their interest in immigration reform and the Peruvian American community, but mostly, it seems, for their pro-market policies. Meanwhile, PAPAC and PAPO endorse candidates who are the most active advocates of immigration reform, as well as expanding education and health access. Thus, while PANR seems to prioritize pro-business as a quality it seeks in candidates, PAPO places that quality third or fourth.

PANR has only endorsed four candidates – Marco Rubio for Senate and Mario Diaz-Balart, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and David Rivera for House of Representatives. All four were endorsed in 2010 and are now in office. In my interview, Jara said PANR endorsed them because “They have been very good friends of the Peruvian American community in Florida [in the sense that] they gave support for the FTA, they have worked with civic issues and immigration issues with Peruvian Americans in the state of Florida.” But PANR’s press release, found on its co-founder’s blog, gave a different reason for the endorsement:

> All candidates endorsed have demonstrated the leadership and fiscal discipline that is much needed in Washington, DC today. They understand the need to balance the budget and that Government does not create jobs, the private sector does and Government needs to provide the right conditions for this to happen… to get Americans and Floridians back to work.”

This second sentence suggests that PANR’s free-market liberalism determines how it judges what is good for Americans. Alternatively or simultaneously, the sentence may be an attempt to frame an endorsement that is good for their personal businesses as good for unemployed Americans. I looked into the positions of the four candidates and found that some are

90 http://garcia-hidalgo.blogspot.com/2010/10/panr-endorses-marco-rubio-mario-diaz.html. Note: this link has been removed since time of research.
interested in immigration reform and/or social services, but all meet PANR’s possible pro-business leanings and are Republicans.

All four candidates supported the USPTPA, as well as U.S. bilateral trade agreements with other countries, such as Colombia and Panama. As shown earlier in the chapter, Rivera’s deputy chief and Diaz-Balart’s website used similar polarizing language to describe their support of the USPTPA and their friendship with Peru and Peruvian Americans. The candidates are very much in line with PANR’s support for the USPTPA and also free-market liberalism.

PANR did not mention seeking candidates who support social services (which PAPAC and PAPO highlighted as important for Peruvians in the U.S.) and PANR’s endorsed candidates all support repealing the health care reform bill and the stimulus package. Candidates were mixed on support of extending benefits for the unemployed. Rubio and Ros-Lehtinen called for permanently extending the Bush tax cuts. Diaz-Balart and Rivera also support continuing Bush’s tax cuts. All four support slashing taxes on corporations, eliminating taxes on capital gains and the estate tax, and reducing taxes on businesses further. Ros-Lehtinen and Diaz-Balart, the only candidates who were already in office, received 78% and 90% scores respectively from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, indicating a track record of support for business.  

The positions of PAPAC and PAPO’s endorsed candidates, all of them Democrats, on U.S. bilateral trade agreements are of interest. While they all supported the USPTPA, they opposed a number of other similar trade agreements. Menendez supported agreements with Australia and Chile, but opposed those with Central America (CAFTA) and Singapore.

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Pascrell and Lautenberg opposed all agreements except the USPTPA. And Corzine opposed all agreements except the USPTPA and NAFTA (Menendez and Pascrell were not in office yet when the NAFTA decision was made). These are not the general “pro-trade” positions that PANR’s endorsed candidates hold. It is also curious that of all the agreements, these candidates chose to support the USPTPA. While there could be a number of various reasons for this discrepancy, Jara, Curitomai, and Garcia-Hidalgo (here representing the Peruvian American Chamber of Commerce of Florida) each claim that their group was responsible for getting Congress to support the USPTPA.

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Coalition members

Analysis of the organizations with which PANR, PAPO, and PAPAC partner shows that PANR’s inclinations are pro-business, while PAPO and PAPAC’s are more mixed. Jara

92 www.ontheissues.org.
93 In the interview, Curitomai said, “We lobby and we supported that FTA and we tried to advocated for the FTA. Especially with our Congressman Bill Pascrell’s support, he never worked for a FTA in all his career. But we approach him, we talked to him and including myself and making an appointment and want him to see the President of Peru himself, Alan Garcia. And they meet together in Washington, DC, and after those meetings, he was in favor of the FTA. He was a member of the Ways and Means committee in those years and he has a very powerful position about it. He said that because people were talking to him and he liked Peruvians and he supported the FTA in a positive way. We advocated for the FTA.”

Meanwhile, in his interview, Jara said, “Yea we were pretty much involved in the FTA between the US and Peru. In fact, I was the only Peruvian American to testify before the Ways and Means Committee of Congress.”

And, complicating the picture further, Ivan Garcia-Hidalgo, speaking for the Peruvian American Chamber of Commerce of Florida, said in his interview, “So during the trade negotiation round that was held in Miami…we were pretty plugged in during that whole process, we were there during the negotiation rounds, and later after the negotiation rounds, during the advocacy piece as well…. I mean I personally worked with [inaudible]’s office director and Stephanie Lester, who is the [inaudible], we had a lot of communications with her and with the minister of foreign trade in Peru, Mercedes Aroz, and with other folks in the executive and legislative branch, just making sure that they understood what was going on, because one of the biggest challenges that you know not only Peru but a lot of other countries have when dealing with the US is they do not necessarily get it…But as a matter of fact, the opening [inaudible], they had asked me to go in as a witness but I had to refuse myself because I had been involved with the Republican party since is was like 14, so you know, I was gonna leave myself very open to attacks, you know from the Left or from the AFL-CIO. So I suggested that we throw down Daniel Jara as a witness.”

And later Garcia-Hidalgo warned me, “But you know the thing with these organizations, is they try to give off a perception of being large or effective but they’re really no more than 4 or 5 people, and that’s one of the reasons I left the Roundtable too – you know they have like 3 people there. So you know I wasn’t gonna put down my name with that. But that’s one of the things. Just be careful who you talk to out there. You know a lot of people talk a big game.” Source: Ivan Garcia-Hidalgo, “Telephone interview,” 17 Jan. 2011.
told me that PANR has worked only with Chambers of Commerce (mostly Hispanic and Peruvian), the Hispanic Alliance for Free Trade, and AIPEUC. As the focus of a Chamber of Commerce is to advocate for business, it follows that PANR’s coalitions and the organizations to which it is somewhat accountable are concerned with advancing business interests. Hispanic Alliance for Free Trade is focused solely on supporting U.S. bilateral trade agreements, particularly the USPTPA and now the agreement with Colombia. I have also found that PANR co-signed a number of letters and petitions to Congress with Chambers of Commerce and U.S. and multinational businesses. Jara also says that PANR also supported the Association of Peruvian Institutions in the U.S. and Canada (AIPEUC). AIPEUC’s website says that its mission is to support Peruvian organizations in the U.S. and Canada and to represent the community, but the only piece of advocacy or activity of AIPEUC that I could find was their support of the Double Citizenship Law in 1992.

PAPAC and PAPO’s coalition partners, such as the Latino Leadership Alliance of New Jersey, Immigrants Rights Defense Committee of New Jersey, the Colombian Organization of American Citizens, and the Dominican American Council of New Jersey, are more varied. In addition to immigration reform organizations and several coalitions, Curitomai told me that his groups have worked with the Statewide Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (of New Jersey and of which Daniel Jara is the president) and the Peruvian American Chamber of Commerce of New Jersey. Therefore it seems that PAPAC and PAPO choose their partners mostly based on common Hispanic interests, namely

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94 Jara 2011.
97 Curitomai 2011.
immigration, but also somewhat on business interests. PAPAC and PAPO’s coalition choices will be explored more in the next chapter.

_A closer look at the leaders_

There is little doubt that some of the leaders of the three of the mainstream Peruvian American political organizations stand to gain economically from their pro-business efforts, especially the USPTPA. In addition to a jitney bus company based out of Paterson, New Jersey, Curitomai owns an import/export business in Peru. A business that ships between the U.S. and Peru would stand to benefit from the tariff reductions in the USPTPA. Curitomai even said during my interview that his business would benefit from the Agreement, as an example of how it could help Peruvians and Peruvian Americans. He said, “I’m importing heavy equipment to Peru, machineries and [inaudible] equipments to Peru and there is a big improvement in commercial trade with Peru and that’s why I supported the FTA was the US,” and later, “I am importing equipment from the US to Peru, I have a business in Peru”.  

Other PAPAC and PAPO leaders, however, do not appear to have the same direct benefit from the Agreement as Curitomai. Interestingly, Dino Callegari, the president of PAPAC before Curitomai, works for Wells Fargo Home Mortgaging. This is worth noting because one frequent area of focus in PAPAC’s workshops and public statements is helping people learn to refinance their houses – an issue that, at first glance, does not fit in with PAPAC and its mission.  

It is possible that, in holding these workshops, Callegari is trying to acquire more business. However it is also possible that he is simply trying to help the Peruvian American community using the knowledge and skills that he possesses as a

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91 Curitomai 2011.  
mortgage broker. I did not find evidence that Aristo Carranza or Sergio Massa, two other important leaders of PAPO, stand to gain economically from the US-PTPA. Carranza is a dentist and I could not find information on Massa’s employment.

Jara owns Rimac Agency, Inc, “an insurance, Hispanic market and international trade consulting firm located in Hackensack, NJ”.100 His business is likely to benefit from the USPTPA, which may increase the number or scale of companies trading between the U.S. and Peru and therefore seeking his company’s consultation. He is also the president of the Statewide Hispanic Chamber of Commerce of New Jersey, a group that, by definition, advocates in the interest of business.

Other board members of PANR also stand to benefit from the group’s pro-business activities, especially the USPTPA. Ivan Garcia-Hidalgo, the group’s co-founder, was the director of AT&T’s Strategic Partner and Alliances Group from 2007 to 2009. In that position and previously when he ran his own firm, he represented U.S. telecommunications companies in Latin America. He currently works as an associate for Visión Américas, a company that assists U.S. companies “seeking to invest in Latin America,” helps “foreign investment promotion agencies to attract U.S. investment,” and “engage[s] U.S. embassy for ‘advocacy’ and foreign government agencies for a ‘fair shake’”.101 Similarly, PANR board member George Makhlouf worked for the family groups of U.S. multinational firms in Latin America and in 2008 became the “Mergers and Acquisitions New Business Development Manager for PepsiCo Latin America Beverages for all Caribbean and Latin America”.102

102 www.panr.us.
Thus, it is possible that PANR’s support for businesses and USPTPA is partly motivated by the economic benefits they would bring to the leaders themselves.

In terms of personal backgrounds that suggest the possibility of political self-interest in the organizations’ activities, the fact that leaders of all three groups have run for office may be telling. Daniel Jara ran unsuccessfully for a seat in the Peruvian congress in 2006, after which he, along with PAPAC and PAPO, began a campaign to pressure the Peruvian government to reserve a seat in congress for Peruvians living abroad.\(^{103}\) Aristo Carranza of PAPO ran unsuccessfully for state congress in New Jersey.\(^ {104}\) Perhaps the three groups’ numerous galas are, in part, an effort to raise the profile of their leaders, who have political or business ambitions that would benefit from more widespread recognition.

**Conclusion**

Holding the search for evidence in favor of the *political transnationalism* assumptions until the next chapter, this chapter finds that there is most likely an impact of personal and economic self-interest and free-market liberalism in all three organizations. It would appear that, at times the leaders of the organizations are using their groups to advance their own interests and sometimes they interpret and act on the needs of Peruvians in the U.S and Peruvians in Peru through the lens of their free-market liberalism. Activities in favor of business, such as workshops, a business incubator, and support for bilateral trade agreements appear to result from either economic self-interest or concern for Peruvians filtered through free-market liberalism. Certain discourse, particularly “othering” of Peruvians and Peruvians


living in the U.S. who do not share the leaders’ free-market liberal ideology appears to be a result of the leaders’ free-market liberalism.

As this chapter is not looking for evidence of concern for Peruvian Americans and Peruvians and for taking political and economic risks on their behalf, the picture is still incomplete. While those factors and interests, particularly the first, may be somewhat present for PANR, it appears that the group’s actual priorities may lie more closely with the political and economic self-interest and free-market liberal ideology hypotheses. This analysis also found evidence for those hypotheses in PAPO and PAPAC’s activities, though, as the next chapter will show, these two organizations may also fit into the assumptions of political transnationalism as well. These findings suggest that the political transnationalism theory be expanded to include these other factors. Some groups may only engage in activities fitting into the original theory, others may engage only in activities serving the self-interest of the leaders and/or filtered through a particular ideology, while others may exhibit evidence of parts of both types of factors.
Chapter 5 – Taking political risks: The other side of the lobbies

Holding lobbies to their missions, part II. Are they more than vehicles of self-interest?

Introduction

To complement the findings of the previous chapter and develop a more holistic picture of PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR, I again hold the actions and discourse of the mainstream Peruvian American political organizations to their self-descriptions and to the political transnationalism assumptions. But this time, I look for evidence that immigrant interest groups are concerned with the interests of their immigrant community and country of origin, as well as increasing the community’s political participation in the host country. I again analyze the organizations’ activities, positions, endorsements, coalition partners, characterization of dissidents, and the leaders as individuals. I do this because factors that influence the organizations decisions may be found in more than their words and actions.

The last chapter found evidence for political and economic self-interest and free-market liberalism in the actions of PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR. In this chapter, I expect to find some evidence that in addition to those factors, the organizations are motivated by concern for Peruvian living in the U.S. and increasing their political involvement, and also concern for Peru, as their mission statements claim. I expect to find that those groups only endorsed candidates who supported the USPTPA and other pro-business measures, but also who supported immigration reform and social services and other legislation targeting less wealthy Peruvian Americans. I expect to find a variety of coalition partners, including
organizations that work for business interests as well as those that work for immigration and Hispanic issues. And I expect that the leaders of PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR may have some personal economic, and perhaps, political interest in the groups’ activities, but that this interest may be limited or tempered by other interests.

In this chapter, I find evidence that PAPAC and PAPO sometimes risk their own political and economic self-interest and even sometimes separate their free-market liberal ideology from some of their actions. While there is certainly evidence that in other areas those factors do play a role, as I found in the previous chapter, it is evident that in terms of their advocacy for immigration reform and support of undocumented immigrants, the leaders of PAPO and PAPAC take a political risk to help the Peruvian community in the U.S. – just as their mission and the political transnationalism theory might say.

PANR, on the other hand, is not found to take similar political and economic risks, or to ever go against their free-market liberalism. While PANR did raise funds for the victims of the 2007 earthquake in Peru, this type philanthropy is not politically risky, as it does not require a change of the status quo, does not go against the U.S. political mainstream, and is not uncommon even among Chambers of Commerce.¹⁰⁵ I do, however, find some nuance in the candidates endorsed, as some of them are strongly in support of immigration reform.

**Endorsed candidates**

As shown in the previous chapter, PANR’s four endorsed candidates were all Republicans who had good track records with business and who had similar ideological views about political opponents in Latin American. However, some of PANR’s endorsed

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candidates did support immigration reform. While Rubio opposed the DREAM Act\textsuperscript{106}, Diaz-Balart and Ros-Lehtinen supported it and Rivera supported the House version of the Act. Rubio initially criticized Arizona’s SB1070, but now supports it. Meanwhile, Diaz-Balart and Ros-Lehtinen have supported providing in-state tuition, educational benefits, welfare, and health care services to undocumented immigrants.\textsuperscript{107} Rivera’s deputy chief informed me that, while Rivera supports immigration reform in theory, “before any immigration issues are addressed, three points must be met: securing the border, employers that are hiring illegal immigrants are controlled and fined, and there must be a viable guest worker program”\textsuperscript{108}. While Jara said that the endorsed candidates were all “friends of Peruvian Americans” and supported immigration reform, it seems that some are and some are not.

PAPAC and PAPO’s endorsed candidates follow a very different pattern from PANR’s. While they supported the USPTPA, all the candidates that PAPAC and PAPO chose to endorse were very strong on the immigration reform, as well as social services, front. Curitomai said in the interview that PAPAC and PAPO mostly supported the candidates that are supporting our needs, our concerns, issues like immigration, education, opportunity for our community...We are not working with only one party.\textsuperscript{109}


\textsuperscript{107} www.ontheissues.org.


\textsuperscript{109} Curitomai 2011.
PAPAC endorsed a number of candidates for local positions, including city councils in New Jersey towns, mayor of Paterson, freeholders, and sheriffs. These candidates have almost all been Democrats and most have been Hispanic.\textsuperscript{110}

PAPO and PAPAC also endorsed several candidates for state and federal positions, all of them Democrats and only one Hispanic. The main endorsements were Corzine for governor of New Jersey, Bill Pascrell for U.S. House of Representatives, and Robert Menendez and Frank Lautenberg for U.S. Senate.\textsuperscript{111} Curitomai’s praise of Corzine, on behalf of PAPAC and PAPO, was featured most often in local newspapers. Curitomai said the groups endorsed Corzine because his “background, including his years as the CEO of Goldman Sachs, made him the best candidate for governor”,\textsuperscript{112} because of his “views on tax relief and education - shared concerns of the Passaic County Latino community,” and because of his “leadership in his response to the global economic recession, his commitment to education and his continued fight for healthcare”.\textsuperscript{113}

Only the first factor given reflects pro-business reasoning. The rest reflect the stated goals of PAPAC and PAPO. Curitomai said PAPAC endorsed Pascrell because he “was a big supporter of immigration, education.” PAPO also endorsed Senator Frank Lautenberg, a Democrat who supported “all forms of immigration reform that favors immigrants, voted for the Free Trade Agreement between Peru and the United States, and publicly stated his support for Temporary Protection Status for Peruvians in the U.S. territory”.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{110} www.peruvianamericans.com.
\textsuperscript{111} www.curito.com.
\textsuperscript{113} Cunningham 2005.
\textsuperscript{114} www.curito.com.
A brief analysis of these politicians’ positions shows a marked contrast with those endorsed by PANR. Corzine, Menendez, Lautenberg, and Pascrell all opposed extending the Bush tax cuts, eliminating the estate tax, and cutting income and capital gains taxes and business taxes. They received “low” scores from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (27%, 38%, 26%, and 39% respectively), indicating less interest in supporting business. This stands in contrast with economic self-interest and free-market liberalism, as PAPAC and PAPO endorsed candidates whose policies would not necessarily directly benefit their businesses.

Corzine, Menendez, and Pascrell all supported the health care reform bill, the stimulus package, and extending benefits to the unemployed. They also received high scores from the National Education Association (91% for Corzine, 100% for Menendez, 82% for Lautenberg, and 91% for Pascrell), indicating a possible strong record of support for public education. These policies are in line with PAPO and PAPAC’s stated concern for the social welfare of Peruvian Americans. Also interesting is that, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the only bilateral trade agreement that all four politicians supported was the USPTPA.

Corzine, Menendez, Pascrell, and Lautenberg have been concerned with the fate of documented and undocumented immigrants, also in line with the stated goals of PAPO and PAPAC. All four support allowing in-state tuition, educational benefits, welfare, and health care services for undocumented immigrants. Menendez, Lautenberg, and Pascrell voted to continue funding “sanctuary cities.” Menendez and Lautenberg also opposed endorsement-only immigration policy and supported allowing illegal immigrants to participate in social security and giving guest workers a path to citizenship.\footnote{www.ontheissues.org.}

\footnote{www.ontheissues.org.}
In general, it appears that, unlike PANR, PAPAC and PAPO sometimes put the needs of the Peruvian American community before the leaders’ own business and political interests. Curitomai mentioned this issue in my interview:

We supported the Governor Corzine, he has our support, but technically Governor Christie win, and we see, as a businessman I can see that is a positive way, it can be positive for our economic situation, but as a community member, I see all the effects it have in the education, poverty reduction, has affected our community, social services, immigration, that those affect our community, and that’s something that we have to see.117

Here, Curitomai acknowledges that his perspective is different from that of many Peruvians in the U.S., yet he feels that his organizations should endorse candidates meeting the needs of the latter.118

**PAPAC, PAPO, and undocumented immigrants**

Throwing parties and supporting businesses may be a large part of PAPAC and PAPO’s activities, but perhaps equally large have been the efforts in support of undocumented immigrants. As shown above, all of their endorsed candidates support expanding options for undocumented immigrants. But beyond that, the organizations are active in taking political and economic risks to go against the U.S. mainstream and status quo in their support of undocumented immigrants. Through protests, petitions, negotiations with politicians, class action lawsuits, and public statements, both groups have been very active in support of various types of immigration reform. When I asked

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117 Curitomai 2011.
118 Curitomai’s personal campaign contributions are more ambiguous. In 2004, he donated several thousand dollars to the National Republican Congressional Committee. In 2006, he gave several thousand to Menendez’s campaign, $300 to Pascrell’s campaign, and $500 to the National Republican Congressional Committee. In 2009, he gave several thousand to Pascrell and severeral thousand to Hillary Clinton’s campaign, but also $500 to McCain’s campaign (www.campaignmoney.com). While this shows a personal preference for Pascrell and Menendez, he seems to support Republicans in general, as well.
Curitomai what his groups do, he launched into a powerful cry for immigration reform. He said

We advocated for people that come to this country to make a living, to work, and that they didn’t commit any crime, just to cross the border maybe to bring some better future for his family, that has working in this country supporting his relatives or doing the job that not too many Americans want to do. We support that kind of people. We have over 10 million people that need some kind of legalization or some kind of opportunity to become a resident, maybe a citizen in the future. We are not asking for any kind of amnesty...We’re asking for some kind of opportunity with the [inaudible] so those people can become residents. Some way of paying dues or paying fees or doing studies of ESL or demonstrating that good behavior – all the stuff that needs to be resident and citizen of the US. We need to give those people opportunity. The DREAM Act – it’s a shame that we can’t give opportunity to young people that are studying in this country, that speak the language, it would be great to them and young people that they want to give a life for US, seeing the opportunities not just for them but for our country itself… And to deny that kind of opportunity for these young people is a shame for this country. Really I was very unhappy.119

While he may be a businessman concerned with business interests and popularity, it is clear that Curitomai, who is also the president of the Immigrants Rights Defense Committee of New Jersey (IRDC), cares about undocumented immigrants.120 This concern is reflected in the actions of PAPAC and PAPO, as well. PAPAC’s 2007 newsletter stresses immigration reform and for the community to be “vocal supporters” and to “look to local officials to support our cause”.121 A 2006 Record article covers a rally in Newark sponsored by the IRDC and cosponsored by PAPAC, among other groups.122 IRDC sponsored and PAPAC cosponsored a similar rally “for fair and comprehensive immigration reform” in 2007.123

One of PAPO’s member groups, the Peruvian American Coalition of Miami, along with Honduran Unity announced a class-action lawsuit that “will argue that the children's

119 Curitomai 2011.
constitutional rights have been violated because of the unremitting fear that they will be deported with their parents, and so denied the benefits that come with growing up in the United States”.  PAPAC’s gathering at the State House to “urge municipalities to adopt ordinances protecting immigrants” was covered in a 2007 Herald News report. Later that year, PAPAC’s efforts seem to have been somewhat successful, as the newspaper covered a local mayor’s executive order to make his town a sanctuary for immigrants and cites Romi Herrera of PAPAC as one who helped negotiate the agreement.

PAPAC, and to some extent PAPO, have been very active in support of undocumented immigrants. As discussed above, this activity fits into the political transnationalism assumptions, as protecting rights of immigrants and providing them with a path to citizenship would enable their political participation. And the activity demonstrates that real concern for Peruvians in the U.S. sometimes supersedes the economic and political interests of the leaders of PAPAC and PAPO because the organizations could easily continue to claim to represent and support Peruvians in the U.S. without taking a position that goes against the U.S. mainstream. It would have been easier politically for the leaders to simply claim to work only for the benefit of Peruvians who are citizens or documented immigrants in the U.S.

126 The article says such an executive order is “largely symbolic, but runs counter to recent ordinances adopted by other municipal governments restricting the rights of unregistered immigrants. It invokes a U.S. Supreme Court ruling stating that undocumented aliens are protected by the U.S. Constitution and are entitled to the full benefit of municipal services without showing proof of immigration status. The order also prohibits police from asking immigrants for documentation in situations such as traffic stops” (Brubaker 2007).
The earthquake of 2007

PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR all engaged in relief efforts for the victims of the earthquake.\textsuperscript{128} But relief efforts are not politically or economically risky, as explained above. What is perhaps of more interest is that PAPAC and PAPO also responded to the earthquake by becoming active supporters of Temporary Protection Status (TPS) for Peruvians. Jara says that PANR supported it as well, but I found no evidence of activism.\textsuperscript{129} While it is a response to the earthquake and could indirectly affect Peru, its real impact would be on undocumented Peruvian immigrants already in the U.S. or seeking to come to the U.S. Therefore, it is really a temporary substitute for immigration reform.

Curitomai explained to me the deaths and destruction caused by the earthquake and then said, “And we’re asking our government to give you a temporary protection system, it’s a law that has been used for other countries to temporarily provide to them to be granted some kind of work permit and they can work legally. We lobbied and worked with that and unfortunately we couldn’t get it”.\textsuperscript{130} PAPO’s efforts included sending letters to Presidents Bush and Garcia, the Chancellor of Peru, Homeland Security, and a number of Congress people in 2007 and 2008.\textsuperscript{131} PAPAC’s newsletter also calls for it\textsuperscript{132} and Herrera said in the \textit{Herald News} that PAPAC “helped generate thousands of letters and emails of support for TPS to federal officials.” The group secured support from 11 Congress people and held a march in support of TPS.\textsuperscript{133} Although, as Curitomai said in the article, Peruvians in the U.S.

\textsuperscript{129} Jara 2011.
\textsuperscript{130} Curitomai 2011.
\textsuperscript{131} http://papousa.net/tps.html
\textsuperscript{132} www.peruvianamericans.com
who received TPS could send more remittances back to Peru, the greatest impact of the status would be for Peruvians already in the U.S., so TPS might be considered a type of targeted immigration reform.

*Increasing Peruvian American political participation*

As their mission statements say, PAPAC and PAPO aim to increase Peruvian participation in U.S. politics. To some extent, their activities reflect this aim. While increasing Peruvian American political participation is not politically or economically risky, it is still worth considering because it shows that the organizations do devote their resources and efforts as predicted by the *political transnationalism* assumptions and their own mission statement. In a 2007 *Herald News* article, Curitomai said that PAPO is “asking people to get more involved in the political field.” In my interview with Curitomai, he said that one activity of PAPAC is “to bring our current generations, Peruvian descendents candidates to have in positions, to bring some Peruvian descendents to office”\(^{134}\) He also said that electing Peruvians to office is currently PAPAC’s “main goal”\(^{135}\). Curitomai also posted a letter to “friends” on his website, imploring them to become more politically active\(^{136}\).

In terms of actual actions on the part of the two groups, in 2004, PAPAC held a seminar to “provide information about new immigration policies under the Bush administration, and to answer questions about the citizenship process. But beyond that, it was a chance to mobilize Hispanics, Peruvians in particular, to become more politically active.

\(^{134}\) Henry 2007.
\(^{135}\) Curitomai 2011.
\(^{136}\) www.curito.com
active”. And at its First National Annual Meeting in 2008, PAPO included several workshops on political organizing.

This section demonstrates important distinctions between PANR and the other two groups. It shows that PANR’s activities may resemble those of a Chamber of Commerce or ambitious politicians. The activities of PAPO and PAPAC, on the other hand, do seem to fall in line with their stated goals. But, perhaps nearly half of their activities – supporting businesses and the USPTPA, extravagant galas, Colombia’s FTA – are also perhaps out of line with their stated goals and more reflective of political and economic self-interest and free-market liberal ideology.

Leaders and friends

While PANR seems to have worked almost exclusively with various Chambers of Commerce (and AIPEUC which appears to be fairly inactive and apolitical besides its push for dual citizenship), PAPAC and PAPO have worked with a wider range of organizations. PAPO itself is a coalition of multiple organizations. As stated before, these are not political organizations, but rather “Peruvian American Coalitions” devoted to helping Peruvians adjust to life in the U.S. (with the exception of PAC-Miami, headed by Sergio Massa, which also advocates for immigration reform). Curitomai informed me that PAPAC and PAPO have also worked with the Immigrants’ Rights Friends’ Committee of New Jersey, Colombian Organization of American Citizens, and the Dominican American Council of New Jersey. While I could not find more information on these three groups, Curitomai says

PAPAC and PAPO work with them because “we have the same issues…like immigration.” PAPAC and PAPO are also members of the Latino Leadership Alliance of New Jersey LLANJ.\textsuperscript{139} This coalition has similar aims as PAPAC and PAPO’s stated aims, including immigration reform, expansion of social services, and increasing Hispanic political participation.\textsuperscript{140}

As evidence in support of political transnationalism’s assumptions, it is significant that, outside of his work with PAPAC and PAPO, Curitomai is president of the Immigrants Rights Defense Committee of New Jersey, which organized most of the immigrant rights rallies discussed above. In his bus company’s newsletter, Curitomai included pleas for his employees to vote and warned them of abuses by immigration police.\textsuperscript{141} In support of the transnational component of political transnationalism, Curitomai and Jara, and likely other leaders of the groups, have family and friends living in Peru whom they keep in mind in their political activity in the U.S, according to my interview with Curitomai and Jara’s statements in newspaper articles.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter again holds the three organizations to their mission statements and to the political transnationalism assumptions from a number of different entry points – activities, “othering,” endorsed candidates, coalition members, and personal lives. In this chapter, I found evidence that the leaders of PAPAC and PAPO do not take actions only that would benefit them politically or economically. Instead, I found that they sometimes engage in personally politically and economically risky actions in support of Peruvians living in the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{139} Curitomai 2011. \\
\textsuperscript{140} Latino Leadership Alliance of New Jersey, LLANJ, Web. 14 Apr. 2011 <www.llanj.org>. \\
\textsuperscript{141} www.curito.com.}
U.S. Endorsed candidates generally choose social services and immigrant rights over businesses, coalition members are both Chambers of Commerce and immigrant rights groups, and political dissidents are, in some instances “othered” and in others acknowledged and included. I also found that they seem to sometimes separate their free-market liberalism from their activities as leaders of Peruvian organizations. By contrast, I found that PANR’s areas of interest generally lie outside those assumed by *political transnationalism*. Instead, activities, endorsed candidates, and coalition members are almost exclusively pro-business.
Chapter 6 – Conclusions

The main findings of this thesis are that existing theory on immigrant interest groups indeed overlooks important factors, which come with the particular demographic of the leaders, that influence the agenda-setting and discourse of immigrant interest groups. This thesis found that, in reality, the mainstream Peruvian American lobby’s agendas and discourse are influenced, not only by a concern for the immigrant community and country of origin, as the literature assumes, but also for the political and economic interests of the leaders of the groups. Furthermore, the leaders’ interpretation of the interests of the immigration community and country of origin is sometimes conditioned by the leaders’ free-market liberal ideology.

The main contribution of this thesis to knowledge on immigrant organizing is its analysis of the impact of leaders’ self-interest and free-market liberalism on interest group activities and discourses. This thesis found that, as a result of those factors, the Peruvian American lobby devotes much of its resources to workshops, forums, and incubators for businesses, advocacy for bilateral trade agreements, and self-promotional galas. Much of the discourse presented Peruvian American and Peruvian interests as identical to business interests and excluded alternative voices. Coalition members tended to be Chambers of Commerce and other business-oriented organizations. And endorsed candidates often shared such free-market liberal values. However, the thesis also found that the lobby is
simultaneously involved in politically risky advocacy for undocumented immigrants, an inconsistency that calls for further research.

While the leaders undoubtedly stand to benefit financially from some their organizations’ policies, self-interest could not always be distinguished from free-market liberalism because both can have the same resulting discourses and activities – pro-business activities could be aimed at helping the leaders’ businesses or they could be executed with Peruvians in mind, thinking that what is good for business really is good for the whole population. And discourse excluding dissenters and on the centrality to Peruvians of supporting business could be intended to steer policy in favor of businesses in order to help the leaders’ businesses and to keep in line with U.S. objectives, or again, such discourse could simply be a reflection of the ideology of the leaders. Importantly, this thesis also found that, in the case of the leaders of PAPO and PAPAC, ideological and self-interested activities can coexist with serving the community through the selfless advocacy for undocumented immigrants. This apparent inconsistency is an area for possible further research.

This thesis found that the leaders’ free-market liberalism (or possibly self-interest) impacted their discourse on Peruvian interests. Language describing people who did not share the lobby’s ideology, such as Ollanta Humala and the protestors in Bagua, as well as Peruvians in the U.S. who opposed the USPTPA, tended to be exclusionary and sometimes conflated the dissenters’ views with opposition to democracy and to the U.S. The leaders also tended to conflate business interests with Peruvian interests, which may be a result of concern for Peruvian interest perceived through the lens of free-market liberalism. While the leaders of PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR may have genuinely believed that their language
accurately conveyed Peruvian interests, it in fact excluded some Peruvian and Peruvian American voices and may not have even reflected majority Peruvian interests.

Free-market liberalism and/or economic self-interest also seem to have led the three organizations to focus a large part (in PANR’s case, nearly the entirety) of their efforts on measures that favor businesses. The three groups used endorsements, letters, meetings with politicians, and festivities such as Peru’s Independence Day at the White House to support the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement. They also worked to pass the U.S. bilateral trade agreement with Colombia. They held workshops for businesses and frequently worked with Chambers of Commerce. PANR also started a multinational business incubator and endorsed Republicans exclusively, saying that the endorsees “know the government doesn’t create jobs, the private sector does.” The leaders of the three organizations own businesses that would benefit from the lobby’s activities.

However, it is also possible that some or all of these pro-business activities were out of concern for Peruvian and Peruvian American interests but were perceived through the lens of free-market liberalism. Further research is necessary to distinguish between the two factors in each instance.

While PANR’s agenda is almost exclusively in favor of business, this thesis found that PAPAC and PAPO devote much of their resources to the politically risky advocacy of undocumented immigrants. All major candidates endorsed by the two organizations have supported immigrants’ rights and pathways to citizenship. PAPAC and PAPO have helped organize rallies for immigration reform and have been part of the creation of several sanctuary cities in New Jersey. The Peruvian American Coalition of Miami, a member of PAPO, is devoted almost exclusively to immigration reform. The groups have also
contributed heartfelt pleas on behalf of undocumented people to the discourse on immigrants. These efforts are politically risky because, unlike efforts in support of business, they go against the status quo, especially during these times of Arizona’s SB1070, accusations of “anchor babies,” and Islamophobia.

PANR’s agenda and discourse, while inconsistent with its self-description, seem to be consistent with the theories of self-interest and free-market liberalism. None of its activities fall outside of either possibility. Even its charity for the victims of the earthquake do not put its other interests or ideology in jeopardy. But PAPO and PAPAC’s simultaneous support for undocumented immigrants and focus on business and trade seem almost contradictory. It is possible that immigration reform aligns with the leaders’ brand of free-market liberalism. Or perhaps immigration reform would somehow benefit the leaders economically. Or it is possible that the groups simply are inconsistent – the leaders are both political entrepreneurs for immigrants and self-interested businessmen – and that various factors are at play at various times. This question is an area for further research.

There is also a need for further research into the possibility of other factors that impact the agenda-setting and discourse of immigrant interest groups. Within the three organizations analyzed in this study, there may be other factors present that were overlooked. Furthermore, while the Peruvian population in the U.S. has much in common with other immigrant groups, there is, of course, much in contrast. Therefore there are likely other factors in addition to or instead of self-interest and political predispositions that impact the agenda-setting of other immigrant lobbies. Further research into other immigrant lobbies will also help establish the generalizability of the findings of this thesis. It could also be useful to
conduct a survey of Peruvian American opinions to gauge to what extent their views are reflected in the positions of the lobby.

On a scholarly level, the findings of this thesis help to fill a hole in the literature on immigrant interest groups, suggesting that the various strands be expanded to look at the roles of other potential influential factors, such as political and economic self-interest and ideology stemming from the particular demographics of the leaders of the organizations. Scholars on immigrant interest groups have yet to develop a generalizable theory about the role of self-interest or ideology in lobby agenda-setting and discourse.

Specifically, 5th column scholars might be surprised to learn that the government of Peru has little influence over the activities of the Peruvian American lobby, but rather the leaders of the lobby act autonomously based on their own interests and ideology and, in the case of support for undocumented immigrants, the interests of the immigrant population. Scholars of class and self-interest, as well as free-market liberalism, can now see their theories extended to a new subject – immigrant interest groups. And, most importantly, scholars of political transnationalism, already aware of the demographic differences between leaders and average immigrants as articulated by Guarnizo, can now begin to fill the void of research on the impact of such differences on the discourse and agendas of immigrant interest groups.

Scholars of political transnationalism see the creation and activities of immigrant interest groups as advancing the political incorporation of those immigrant groups and extending democratic involvement and voice to previously underrepresented groups. Instead, the findings of this thesis suggest that the Peruvian American mainstream organizations are not always giving voice to underrepresented Peruvian Americans but rather to business
interests, which were already represented by Chambers of Commerce, corporate lobbyists, and established political parties. Thus the claim that immigrant interest groups help previously underrepresented communities enter U.S. politics is not always the case (though it is sometimes, as in PAPAC and PAPO’s advocacy for undocumented immigrants). By neglecting to analyze the interests and ideology of the leaders of these interest groups, scholars in the political transnationalism field may misjudge the impact of such groups, at least in the case of Peruvian Americans. They predict that such organizations expand political incorporation, but perhaps these groups also strengthen existing class and economic divisions.

On a practical level, the findings of this thesis have implications for both policymakers and interest group leaders. Because immigrant lobbies (or at least the Peruvian American lobby) to some degree reflect the personal interests and ideology of their leaders, it is possible that some of the immigrant population’s interests may be excluded from the mainstream discourse (see Appendix D for a brief description of some other Peruvian American organizations outside the mainstream). Therefore, while the activity of such lobbies may be a step towards the incorporation of previously marginalized populations in U.S. politics, some non-elite voices within those populations may still be left out of the mainstream discourse. As Strolovitch shows in the case of women’s and African American advocacy organizations, for groups whose marginality intersects with other groups’ marginality, needs are not always voiced by their interest groups.

Applied to immigrant populations, there is perhaps a need for those interests that are separate from immigrant interests to be addressed, either by their immigrant lobbies or by other organizations. For example, as many immigrants are laborers, it might be beneficial to
them if their immigrant interest groups addressed their needs as laborers and/or U.S. labor groups became more inclusive of immigrants. As the system currently stands, besides its advocacy for immigration reform, the Peruvian American lobby is mostly a reflection of the U.S. political sphere, in which businesses have the loudest voice. The findings of this thesis are a case for policymakers to perhaps look beyond the mainstream interest groups in order to best meet the needs of their constituents.

The lessons for PAPAC, PAPO, and PANR are to become aware of and upfront about their distinct demographic and corresponding interests and ideology, to attempt to include those of different demographics, interests, and ideology into the discourse on immigrant interests, and to more fully take on the role of political entrepreneurs for Peruvians living in the U.S. PAPAC and PAPO already do this in their work in support of undocumented immigrants. But they, and especially PANR, could still do more to separate their interests from their role as political entrepreneurs.

One way the Peruvian lobby could better assume this role is to use less exclusionary language in describing Peruvians and Peruvian Americans who are not in line with the particular ideology of the leaders of the lobby. Those dissenters make up an important minority among Peruvians in the U.S. and perhaps a majority among Peruvians in Peru. A lobby that claims to advocate on behalf of that entire population must include dissenting voices in their agenda-setting and discourse. Another way to better play the role of political entrepreneur might be to set up a mechanism for Peruvians in the U.S. to better voice their interests to the lobby. This might include the use of social media tools, door-to-door surveys, and cooperation with a wider range of existing Peruvian American organizations outside the
mainstream, as well as non-Peruvian organizations that work in areas, such as labor, women’s rights, and indigenous rights, that are likely relevant to many Peruvians in the U.S.

Finally, as Guarnizo showed, Peruvian American interest groups are not unique in the elite demographic of their leaders. Many other immigrant interest groups are also led by individuals who are wealthier, better connected, and more educated than the rest of the particular immigrant population. It is therefore likely that other immigrant interest groups also engage in discourse and activities that are impacted by class- and self-interest and free-market liberalism. As I advise for the leaders of the Peruvian American lobby, leaders of immigrant interest groups should be aware of their unique characteristics relative to the rest of their immigrant community and ensure that they are basing their organizational agendas on the interests of the community, without any bias or self-interest. I encourage them to seek out the INDECAPI’s and TIKSI Group’s of their own immigrant populations and listen to their alternative perspectives.
Works Cited


Hispanic Center, 2009.


Massa, Sergio, Norberto Curitomai, and Aristo Carranza. "Letter to George W. Bush.”


Appendices

Appendix A – Interview guidelines

Interview guidelines for PAPO, PAPAC, and PANR leaders

1) What is the goal of ____?

2) What policy issues and interests does ____ seek to advance?

   a. What type of immigration reform did it support in 2007? And why? What about now in 2010, now that TPS has not been implemented?
   b. If supported USPTPA, why? Did you ever consider advocating for an extension of the Andean Trade Preference Act instead? Did it seem as though the USPTPA was something that the Bush administration already wanted? What about the Garcia administration?
   c. If TPS, why? Same questions as above
   d. What other issues has ____ taken on?

3) Does ____ endorse candidates? Does it make campaign contributions? What types of candidates does ____ tend to endorse?

   a. Do you endorse both Republicans and Democrats? What are the issues you look for in a candidate?
   b. Is there ever a conflict between supporting immigration reform, which most Dems agree with, and the USPTPA, which is a bit more controversial?
   c. What candidates are priorities at this point in time? What issues are priorities now? And why?

4) How do you gauge the community’s opinions? Did you survey them or have meetings with community members?

5) Do you think that most Peruvian Americans supported the USPTPA?

6) Is ____ a member of any coalitions, like the Latino Leadership Alliance?

   a. If yes, why did you choose to join forces with them? And how often do you meet with them?

7) Are there any other organizations you work with?
a. What are they?
b. Why do you work with them?

8) Who would you say you represent?

9) What does ____ do to advance its goals?

10) Is ____ in contact with any Peruvian government officials?

   a. If yes, does the government of Peru ever ask ____ to endorse certain policies?
   b. Is ____ aligned with a particular party in Peru or do you work with whatever party is in office?
   c. Did ____ take a position in the 2006 elections?

11) This is a hypothetical situation: If the government of Peru asked ____ to support a policy that you thought would not be in the interest of Peruvians in the U.S., would you endorse it?

12) Do you have family and friends living in Peru whom you have in mind when supporting policies?

13) How was your support of the USPTPA affected by the protests against it in Peru? What did you say to Peruvian Americans who disagree with your position on the USPTPA or other issues?

_Interview guidelines for endorsed candidates_

1) I’m aware that you received an endorsement from ____ in your bid for ____. Why do you think you received that endorsement?

2) Does ____ represent many voters in your district? Have they supported you in the past?

3) Did you have a position on the Free Trade Agreement with Peru that Congress passed in 2007?

4) What was your position on immigration reform? On Temporary Protection Status for the victims of the earthquake in Peru in 2007?

5) Have you ever met with Peruvian government officials? Maybe at an event sponsored by the ____?

6) Are there any other groups or individuals that have influenced or spoken to you about your position on US relations with Peru?
Appendix B – Methodology

Loosely following the methods employed by Hook and Pu (2006), I scanned the publications, statements, and websites of the organizations and transcripts of my interviews with the leaders for descriptions of the organizations and their missions. I then created 5 categories of descriptions/missions that I found – (a) “advocating for Peruvian Americans,” (b) “increasing Peruvian American political involvement,” (c) “helping Peru,” (d) “raising the organization’s profile,” and (e) “supporting business.” Each category corresponds to a hypothesis. Category (a) indicates the possibility of domestic interest organizations and political incorporation and is identified by statements such as “always trying our best to respond to our community’s needs” (www.peruvianamericans.com). Category (b) indicates political corporation as well and is found in statements such as “support the participation of Peruvians and Latinos in politics in the United States” (www.peruvianamericans.com). Category (c) indicates either political incorporation or 5th column and is drawn from statements such as “our hearts and minds are still very much in Peru” (Llorente 2010). Category (d) slightly indicates political or economic self-interest and is indicated by statements such as “Norberto Curitomai’s gala surpasses expectations. Nearly four hundred people packed the Brownstone House” (www.curito.com). And (e) indicates economic self-interest or pro-business ideology and is signaled by statements such as “we have been serving the business community” (www.panr.us). I then reread the articles, publications, websites, and interview transcripts and for each statement of mission or description of the organization, I put an “X” in the corresponding category in the table.
Appendix C – Content analysis of leaders’ justifications for supporting the USPTPA

In each table, the number indicates each item included in the analysis. The X’s mark the reasons given for supporting the USPTPA in each source. The totals at the ends of the tables shows the total number of times each justification was give. And the percentages below the totals show the percent of each justification out of all the justifications given.

**Table 1B: PAPAC and the USPTPA**

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<th>Help Peruvians</th>
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Appendix D - Relevant organizations and contacts

Peruvian American Political Organizations USA (PAPO)
www.papousa.net
Norberto Curitomai, President
Norberto@expressshuttle.com,
ncuritomai@peruvianamericanpac.com
973-881-9133, 973-332-8520

Peruvian American Political Action Committee of New Jersey (PAPAC)
(Comité Peruano Americano de Acción Política)
www.peruvianamericans.com
Norberto Curitomai, President
Norberto@expressshuttle.com,
ncuritomai@peruvianamericanpac.com
973-881-9133, 973-332-8520

Peruvian American National Roundtable
www.panr.us
Daniel Jara, President
djara@panr.us, djara@shccnj.org

Instituto de Estudios y Capacitación Integral (INDECAPI)
Indecapi.blogspot.com
campananewsprinting@yahoo.com

The Tiksi Group
www.thetiksigroup.wordpress.com
Ana Maria Quispe
Anaq2000@hotmail.com

Association of Peruvian Organizations in the US and Canada (AIPUEC)
(Associación de Instituciones Peruanas en EEUU Y Canada)
www.aipuec-usa.com

Peruvian American Political Alliance of New Jersey
peru@papanj.org

Asociación Peruana de Dallas-Fort Worth
www.asociacionperuana.org
info@asociacionperuana.com

Peruvian American Coalition of Miami (PAC-Miami)
www.peruvianamerican.org
Sergio Massa, President
smassa@bellsouth.net

Peruvian American Coalition of Utah/Idaho (PAC-Utah/Idaho)
Martha del Villar, President
martaedlvillar@hotmail.com

Peruvian American Chamber of Commerce of New York
www.peru-us.org
info@peru-us.org
(212) 572-4889

Peruvian American Chamber of Commerce of Florida
www.peruvianchamber.org
Ivan Garcia-Hidalgo, Board Member
igh@visionamericas.com
Other Peruvian organizations in the U.S.

Chambers of Commerce
- Peruvian American Chamber of Commerce of New Jersey
- Peruvian American Chamber of Commerce of Florida
- Peruvian American Chamber of Commerce of New York
- Peruvian American Chamber of Commerce of Long Island

Apolitical incorporation groups
- PAC-West Palm Beach
- PAC-Los Angeles
- PAC-Virginia
- PAC-Georgia
- PAC-Broward, Florida
- PAC-Utah/Idaho
- PAC-New York

U.S. branches of Peruvian political parties
- Partido Aprista Peruano de New York (PAP-NY)
- Comité de Apoyo Internacional del Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP) de New York
- Paterson Support Committee for Peruvian presidential candidate Ollanta Humala

Alternative views
- The TIKSI Group
- Instituto de Capacitación Ingetral (INDECAPI)
- Ciudadanos de Segunda Categoría
- Blogs – editordelnorte.com; peruanista.blogspot.com; pacasmayo08.blogspot.com

Other special interest Peruvian groups
- Religious associations
  - Hermandad de Damas y Caballeros de San Martín de Porres
  - Asociación Peruana Virgen de Cocharcas
  - Hermandad de la Santísima Virgen de Chapi
- Peruvian American Medical Society (PAMS)

Groups I could not find any information on
- Association of Peruvian Organizations in the U.S. and Canada (AIPEUC)
- Peruvian American National Council